




PRZESTRZEŃ
Społeczna
czasopismo naukowe

Social**SPACE** scientific journal

nr 1/2022 (23)

s o c i a l s p a c e j o u r n a l . e u



Rzeszów 2022

Obowiązkiem uczonego jest nieposłuszeństwo myślenia

Disobedience of thought is the scholar's duty

Stanisław Ossowski

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Społeczna

Social
SPACE

półrocznik

nr 1/2022 (23)

semi-annual

Rzeszów

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Od Redaktora
Editorial

Bez odpowiedzialności zbiorowej

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W dniu 24 lutego 2022 r. Rosja rozpoczęła inwazję na Ukrainę, kontynuując – ograniczoną dotychczas terytorialnie – wojnę z 2014 r. Planując błyskawiczną i skuteczną interwencję militarną z pogardzanym przeciwnikiem, ocenianym jako słabym, Rosja wdała się w przedłużający się konflikt zbrojny, którego skutkiem była kompromitacja militarna, polityczna i moralna agresora, następnie zaś brutalizacja wojny. Bombardowano dzielnice mieszkaniowe, niektóre miasta zrównano z ziemią, celowo bombardowano teatry, szkoły, przedszkola i szpitale, w tym położnicze, ostrzeliwano samochody osobowe, obiekty z widocznymi napisami „DZIECI”, mordowano cywilów, gwałcono kobiety i dzieci, dopuszczano się tortur, grabieży i wywózek.

Agresja Rosji spowodowała masowe potępienie w skali ogólnoswiatowej, którego skutkiem i elementem były niespotykane wcześniej w tej skali sankcje ekonomiczne, zwłaszcza krajów rdzenia światowego systemu ekonomiczno-politycznego. Unaocniły one, że Rosja nie jest – wbrew złudzeniom W. Lenina – częścią tego rdzenia, lecz jedynie elementem próbujących mu się przeciwstawić semiperyferii. Sankcje te unaocniły też, iż rzeczywistą siłą państw jest ich siła ekonomiczna, podczas gdy siła militarna jest tylko pozorem, zwłaszcza jeśli i ona jest bardziej wytworem propagandy niż realnością.

Agresja Rosji spowodowała exodus mieszkańców Ukrainy. Uchodźcy napłynęli najliczniej do Polski, dokąd w ciągu dwóch tygodni dotarło ich ponad dwa miliony, w tym 90% kobiet z dziećmi. Do samej Warszawy napłynęło 300 tys. uchodźców, którzy stanowią tam w czasie pisania tych słów 15% mieszkańców miasta. Napływ uchodźców spotkał się z masową pomocą milionów wolontariuszy, którzy przyjęli uchodźców pod swój dach, pomagali w transporcie oraz działali na przeje-

ściach granicznych, dworcach i miejscach zbiorowego zakwaterowania. Zadziwiająco nieporównywalna z innymi krajami skala pomocy niesionej przez niezwykłych zwykłych ludzi, którzy oferowali uchodźcom własne jedzenie i pieniądze lub wymieniali im ukraińskie hrywny na złote polskie po zawyżonym kursie (np. 1:1, przy kursie komercyjnym 1 UHR = 0,10 PLN).

Co ważne, agresja Rosji spotkała się z masowym poparciem społeczeństwa rosyjskiego, deklarowanym jednak – co trzeba dodać – w warunkach państwa autorytarnego i nachalnej propagandy. Tak więc, na przykład, Rada Rektorów Wyższych Uczelni Sankt Petersburga i Obwodu Leningradzkiego wystosowała wiernopoddańczy adres do prezydenta Rosji, popierający agresję (*Obraszczeniye...*, 2022), zwaną „operacją specjalną”. W tym kontekście z uznaniem trzeba odnotować inicjatywę środowiska Rosyjskiej Akademii Nauk napisania listu otwartego sprzeciwiającego się rozpętaniu przez W. Putina wojny przeciwko Ukrainie (*Rosyjscy naukowcy...*, 2022); według stanu na 10 kwietnia 2022 r., list ten podpisało ok. 8000 naukowców rosyjskich (*Otkrytoje...*, b.d.). Z uznaniem trzeba też odnotować czynny opór niektórych wojskowych rosyjskich, którzy albo odmawiali udziału w tej wojnie, albo nawet poddawali się Ukraińcom, po czym utworzyli Legion „Wolna Rosja”, walczący po stronie ukraińskiej (*Podдали się...*, 2022).

Elementem międzynarodowych sankcji antyrosyjskich było masowe zawieszanie współpracy z wszelkiego rodzaju organizacjami i instytucjami rosyjskimi, co dotyczyło też instytucji naukowych. W tym kontekście należy stwierdzić, że nasze czasopismo „Przestrzeń Społeczna (Social Space)” nigdy nie miało współpracy instytucjonalnej z żadną organizacją z Rosji. Z całą mocą należy natomiast podkreślić, że odrzucamy zasadę odpowiedzialności zbiorowej, w związku z czym nie zamierzamy wykluczać z grona naszych rzeczywistych i potencjalnych współpracowników i autorów nikogo jedynie na podstawie kraju jego pochodzenia lub zamieszkania. Jak bowiem stwierdził ukraiński reżyser filmowy Sergiej Łoźnica, „[b]ojkotować należy tych, którzy bezwstydnie służą reżimowi. Ale potępienie całej rosyjskiej kultury jest [...] bezsensownym gestem” (*Rosjan...*, 2022). Nie zamierzamy więc żądać od nikogo „świadectwa moralności” politycznej, współpracę zamierzamy natomiast prowadzić nieodmiennie na zasadach merytorycznych, eliminując z naszego grona jedynie oso-

by jawnie lub domyślnie pochwalające agresję W. Putina, podczas gdy teksty pochwalające tego rodzaju działania eliminowaliśmy zawsze. Podzielamy stanowisko Rady Naukowej Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, w którym „pragniemy wyrazić nasze poparcie i gotowość pomocy członkom społeczności akademickiej Rosji, którzy wyrazili swój sprzeciw wobec rosyjskiego ataku na Ukrainę oraz związanej z nim kampanii dezinformacji adresowanej do rosyjskiego społeczeństwa” (*Uchwała...*, 2022). Zgodnie bowiem z głęboko zinternalizowanym, chociaż rzadko eksplikowanym, w społeczeństwie polskim poglądem odróżniamy rosyjską (*pyccккyю*) kulturę od rosyjskiego (*poccуūckozo*) państwa, którą to postawę nacjonałiści rosyjscy mylą z rusofobią.

Wicemarszałek Senatu, Michał Kamiński, po wizycie w Buczy na Ukrainie, gdzie obejrzał skutki rosyjskich zbrodni wojennych, stwierdził, że odtąd nie będzie pisał wyrazów *Rosja* i *Rosjanie* wielkimi literami (*Michał Kamiński...*, 2022). Odwołał się przy tym do zachowań niektórych humanistów polskich, którzy po drugiej wojnie światowej pisywali przez jakiś czas wyrazy *Niemcy* i *Niemiec* małymi literami (Kozłowski 2022), chociaż takie rozwiązanie przyjęto w polskiej prasie konspiracyjnej jeszcze w czasie okupacji niemieckiej. Miało to być manifestacją nienawiści i pogardy nie tyle nawet dla wroga, ile dla barbarzyńcy. Zwyczaj pisowni nazwisk małymi literami jako manifestowanej pogardy opisano zresztą jeszcze wcześniej, a mianowicie w powieści Ferencza Molnára (2019) z 1907 r. pt. „Chłopcy z Placu Broni”.

Warto tu jednak przywołać zapamiętaną przez piszącego te słowa, zaprezentowaną w latach 60. XX wieku, relację polskiego korespondenta wojennego Edmunda Osmańczyka, który – wizytując jeden z wyzwolonych niemieckich obozów koncentracyjnych pod koniec drugiej wojny światowej – wskazywał kolejne przykłady zbrodni, podkreślając za każdym razem, jakich to niegodziwości dopuszczali się *Niemcy*. Wtedy podszedł do niego człowiek w pasiaku obozowym, mówiąc: „Ich bin auch *Niemcy*”, sugerując w ten sposób, że stereotypowe uogólnienia bywają nie tylko krzywdzące, ale i bezsensowne.

W tym kontekście warto podkreślić, że piszący te słowa nie da się wciągnąć w cywilizację odpowiedzialności zbiorowej i podejmie wszelkie starania, aby nie dać w nią wciągnąć naszego czasopisma „Przestrzeń Społeczna (Social Space)”. Bliskie są

mu bowiem słowa „Modlitwy o wschodzie słońca” (Gintrowski i inni, 1992): „ale zbaw mnie od nienawiści, ocal mnie od pogardy, Panie”. Nawet jednak nie będąc od niej ocalonym, można uniknąć emocjonalnego naruszania zasad ortografii polskiej, a swe wzburzenie manifestować przez używanie – istniejących już lub tworzonych *ad hoc* – pejoratywnych nazw Rosjan, Rosji i Putina, popisując się przy okazji swą inwencją twórczą, chociaż teksty naukowe nie wydają się do tego najlepszym miejscem. Warto jednak podjąć wysiłek oderwania się od stereotypów, mimo że pełnią one ważną funkcję społeczną, gdyż pomagają uporządkować świat społeczny, chociaż przez uproszczenie jego złożoności.

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Bez odpowiedzialności zbiorowej

Rosyjscy naukowcy przeciwko wojnie z Ukrainą. „Forum Akademickie”, 25.02.2022; <https://forumakademickie.pl/sprawy-nauki/rosyjscy-naukowcy-przeciwko-wojnie-z-ukraina/>.

Uchwała Rady Naukowej IFiS PAN podjęta w dniu 6 kwietnia 2022 roku. Warszawa.

Wpłynęło/received 23.04.2022; poprawiono/revised 16.05.2022

No collective responsibility

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On 24 February 2022, Russia launched her invasion of Ukraine, continuing the territorially limited war of 2014. By planning a swift and effective military intervention on a despised opponent who was judged to be weak, Russia entered a protracted armed conflict, which resulted in their military, political and moral disgrace of the aggressor. The brutalisation of the war is apparent. Residential districts, theatres, schools, kindergartens and hospitals were bombed, some towns were razed to the ground, passenger cars and buildings with visible “CHILDREN” signs were intentionally fired upon, civilians were murdered, women and children raped, and torture, looting and deportation were committed.

Russia’s aggression caused massive condemnation on a global scale, the result of which were economic sanctions that had not been seen before on this scale, especially by the countries of the core of the world economic and political system. They showed that Russia is not – contrary to the delusions of V. Lenin – part of the core, but merely an element of the semi-peripheries trying to oppose it. The sanctions also indicated that the real strength of states is their economic strength, while military power is only an appearance, especially so when it is a product of propaganda rather than reality.

Russia’s aggression caused an exodus of people from Ukraine. The largest number of refugees came to Poland, where over two million people arrived within two weeks, including 90% of women with children. In the city of Warsaw alone, 300,000 refugees arrived who, at the time of writing this text, constitute 15% of the city’s inhabitants. The influx of refugees met with massive help from millions of volunteers who took refugees under their roof, assisted in transport and operated at

border crossings, railway stations and places of collective accommodation. The scale of help provided by extraordinary ordinary people was astonishing. They offered refugees their own food and money or exchanged Ukrainian hryvnias (UHR) for Polish zlotys (PLN) at an overpriced rate (e.g. 1:1, comparing to the commercial rate of 1 UHR = 0.10 PLN).

Importantly, Russia's aggression met with massive support from Russian society, which was, however, declared by an authoritarian state using intrusive propaganda. Thus, for example, the Council of Rectors of Universities of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast issued an allegiance to the President of Russia in support of the aggression (*Obrashchenie...*, 2022), referred to as a "special operation". In this context, one should appreciate the initiative of the Russian Academy of Sciences community who wrote an open letter protesting against the war unleashed by V. Putin against Ukraine (*Rosyjscy naukowcy...*, 2022). As of 10 April 2022, this letter was signed by ca 8,000 Russian scientists (*Otkrytoe...*, n.d.). It is also worth noting the active resistance of some Russian soldiers who either refused to participate in the war or even surrendered to the Ukrainians, and then formed the "Free Russia" Legion, fighting on the Ukrainian side (*Poddali się...*, 2022).

An element of the international anti-Russian sanctions was the massive suspension of cooperation with any Russian organisations and institutions, which also applies to scientific institutions. In this context, it should be stated that our journal "Przestrzeń Społeczna (Social Space)" has never had institutional cooperation with any organisation from Russia. However, it should be emphasized that we reject the principle of collective responsibility and, therefore, do not exclude anyone of our actual or potential collaborators and authors solely on the basis of their countries of origin or residence. For, as the Ukrainian film director Sergei Loznitsa stated, "those who shamelessly serve the regime should be boycotted. But condemning the entire Russian culture is [...] a senseless gesture" (*Rosjan...*, 2022). Therefore, we do not intend to demand a "certificate of political morality" from anyone, but we do intend to eliminate from our milieu those who openly or implicitly approve V. Putin's aggression. Indeed, we have always eliminated texts praising such actions. We share the position of the Scientific Council of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish

Academy of Sciences, in which “we wish to express our support and readiness to help the Russian academic community who expressed their opposition to the Russian attack on Ukraine and the related disinformation campaign addressed to Russian society” (*Uchwała...*, 2022). According to the deeply internalised, although rarely explicated, view in Polish society, we distinguish Russian (*ruszkuyu*) culture from the Russian (*rossiyskoe*) state, which Russian nationalists confuse with Russophobia.

A Deputy Speaker of the Polish Senate after visiting the Ukrainian town of Bucha, where he saw the results of Russian war crimes, stated that he would not capitalise the words *Russia* and *Russians* from now on (*Michał Kamiński...*, 2022). He referred to the behaviour of some Polish humanists, who for some time after the Second World War wrote the words *Germany* and *Germans* in lower case characters (Kozłowski 2022), although such a solution was adopted in the Polish underground press during the German occupation. It was a manifestation of hatred and contempt not so much for the enemy as for the barbarian. The custom of spelling surnames in lower case letters as manifest contempt was described even earlier, in the novel by Ferenc Molnár (1927) from 1907 entitled “The Paul Street Boys”.

However, it is worth recalling the account of a Polish war correspondent, presented in the 1960s, who – while visiting one of the liberated German concentration camps at the end of the Second World War – pointed to individual examples of crimes, emphasizing in each case what wickedness the *Germans* committed. Then a man in a camp striped uniform approached him, saying: “*Ich bin auch Germans*” [*I am Germans too*], thus suggesting that stereotypical generalisations are not only harmful, but also pointless.

In this context, it is worth emphasizing that the present author cannot be drawn into the civilisation of collective responsibility and will make every effort not to get our journal “Przestrzeń Społeczna (Social Space)” similarly drawn in. The words of “Prayers at sunrise” (Gintrowski et al., 1992) are close to him: “but save me from hatred, save me from contempt, Lord”. However, even without being saved from it, you can avoid emotional violation of the principles of Polish spelling, and manifest your indignation by using – already existing or created ad hoc – pejorative names for Russians, Russia and Putin, while showing off your creative invention,

although scientific texts do not seem the best place for that. However, it is worth making an effort to break away from stereotypes, despite the fact that they play an important social function, as they help to organise the social world, even though by doing so they simplify its complexity.

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<https://forumakademickie.pl/sprawy-nauki/rosyjscy-naukowcy-przeciwko-wojnie-z-ukraina/>.

Uchwała Rady Naukowej IFiS PAN podjęta w dniu 6 kwietnia 2022 roku. Warszawa.

Wpłynęło/received 28.04.2022; poprawiono/revised 29.04.2022

Artykuły
Articles

Muslims in the city of Calabar: spatial segregation and the ghetto

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Abstract

The major characteristic of Nigerian society is its pluralism. With the change in the patterns of economic development, the diversity of Nigerian culture is gaining complexity. While maintaining the ideas of secularism and limiting caste politics, society is moving towards polarisation and fragmentation. Moreover, the issue of social exclusion has taken over the recent discourse from central policy-making to political debates and academic discourse, first in Western Europe and later in other parts of the world. Within these challenges, the role of public policy multiplies. As a manifestation of power, the public policy aims at the general concern of its citizens through policy alternatives. While the issue of minority rights has become an important topic, there can be numerous reasons quoted and unquoted for the existing discrimination among Muslims. The exclusion of Muslims as a minority in the Christian-dominated city of Calabar, located in Cross River State, Nigeria, is a living reality. The increasing interplay of religion with education and the under-representation of Calabar City Muslims in the ghettos motivated this research. This work aims to highlight the lack of experience regarding education and the patterns of segregation of Muslims in the city. The mainstream neglects and the everyday struggles of Muslims in maintaining their lives in the ghettos, where the people in the area are languishing and going through cycles of impoverishment in the larger context of urbanisation and globalisation. Also, as settlements influence the making of identity, the choice of educational institutions and socio-economic positionality affect the overall engagement of Muslims in the mainstream.

Keywords: Nigeria, Calabar, ghetto, Muslims, urban space.

1. Introduction

The interest in patterns of representation and inclusion has widened in Nigeria and across the world. In the past few years, the demand for policies of inclusion has considerably increased. Further, the need for public interest and equal rights has

increased the urgency to act. The propagation of democracy has led to a consensus that, in a democratic system, any single group should not have a monopoly on governance. This has led to a greater awareness of the importance of developing policies that address marginalised groups' aspirations to build equity and stability within the political system.

Under-representation of minorities has been discussed in political debates. L. Wirth (1941) describes under-represented minority group as one of individuals who, due to their physical or cultural traits, are picked out for unequal treatment within the society in which they reside and become targets of collective discrimination. From the arithmetical perspective, the term *minority* refers to a group less numerous than others in a society. From the arithmetical perspective, Muslims are a religious minority of less than 5% in Calabar, the capital of Cross River State, Nigeria (John, Ekeke, 2017). However, the Nigerian constitution has anticipated the right to freedom of religion, the conservation of every cultural group's language, and the management of educational institutions. These exclusive rights have offered the minority groups an alternative identity along with the public policies that apply to all.

When groups are restricted from accessing government facilities, it is the constitutional duty of the state to intervene. A. Béteille (2008) and P. Velaskar (1990) point out that inequality in access to education leads to further disparities that create backwardness for the individual, who cannot access other facilities. At the time of schooling, the children's self-image is formed. Students have reported being targeted and questioned about their religious beliefs. Thus, the interaction of a child in school with classmates, teachers and parents aids in the development of self-image. The present research identifies underlying theories of social exclusion concerning the Muslim community in the city of Calabar. This work aims to address the schooling experiences of children living in ghettos and how ghettoisation further perpetuates inequalities within the educational system.

2. Spatial structure and the segregation

Over the past decades, segregation has been widely discussed by social scientists, urban geographers, and planners and most of the literature sees segregation as

a case of spatial injustice. *Segregation* is a term that comes from the Latin *segregare*, which means “to separate an animal from the herd” (Rosiek, Kinslow, 2015: 85). Transposed into an urban context, it referred to an intentional act and was used in works relating to Jewish ghettos in Eastern Europe or South African apartheid to convey the idea of discrimination (Frisch 2011). Spatial structure and segregation demonstrate the geographical polarisation of social groups as well as their social distancing from other groups. It leads to the combination of geographical and social spaces where social groups are identified with an area and are defined by certain groups of people. It thus initiates *spatial consciousness* or the conscious selection of space.

However, urban sociologists have for long advocated that the heterogeneity in cities breaks down rigid social structures and produces increased mobility, instability and insecurity through the affiliation of individuals with a variety of intersecting and tangential social groups with a high rate of membership turnover (Wirth 1938). Social stratification through caste, class, race and ethnicity matters in Nigeria, whereas spatial settlement seems to be an inevitable accompaniment of urban life, and the spatial processes have resulted in many forms of settlements (ghettos, gated communities, ethnic enclaves, religious communities, developments for the elderly etc.) – (Marcuse 2005). This leads to segregation that is, besides, involuntary and less voluntary. The three main processes of segregation are (Schelling 1980): the first, which results from intentional acts of discrimination; the second, which emanates from structural economic forces; and the third, which is the consequence of individual decisions.

Spatial structures reinforce and influence the evolution of social structures, where residential segregation results in circumscribing contacts. The neighbourhood is the most important source of socialisation after the home. The areas of residence are one of the large sets of correlated parameters influencing employment status and educational attainment. The social and economic conditions in ghettos and some ethnic enclaves are partly influential in maintaining the self-perpetuating cycle of poverty in which many racial minorities find themselves, while residential propinquity forms the basis of communities that may eventually explode in the search for social and economic justice (Morgan 1984). Ghettos generate negative intra-ethnic externali-

ties. Growing up in a purely ethnic environment may slow down assimilation, putting the residents at a disadvantage and can have adverse economic effects, e.g. difficulty in acquiring jobs and ethnic organised crime networks may flourish in large ghettos (Anas 2004).

The *ghetto* is an area of spatial concentration used by forces within the dominant society to separate and to limit a particular population group, defined as racial, ethnic or foreign, and held to be, and treated as, inferior by the dominant society (Morgan 1984). Ghettos further lead to a cycle of marginalisation where the individual is cut off from the development and policy of the state due to the discriminatory process. A. Anas (2004) argues that exclusion is an institutionalised policy that prevents minorities from locating in specific places; as the economy of the ghetto becomes isolated, unemployment, poverty, crime and social problems increase, while political power and public expenditures decline. The best form of intermixing of identities and people is through social interaction. Social interaction is the means by which communication, content and information are exchanged between individuals and groups. The classical theories of *structural functionalism* and *social Darwinism* develop the idea that society is thought to be a system of interconnected parts. The social interaction links interconnect these essential parts, which form the whole framework and maintain it at the same time.

Across the globe, the 1970s saw urbanisation formed by corporate capital under the liberal policies of the state. The areas of residence are treated as consumer products, with a huge investment in infrastructure to promote corporate urban development. The residential areas are divided into a variety of patterns, reflecting social divisions based on class, income, nationality, religion, wealth, occupation, race, colour, ethnicity, language, age, household, cultural preference or lifestyle. For purposes of policy-relevant analysis, the important lines of division are understandable based on three distinguishable groups as ideal types: culture, functional economic role and position in the hierarchy of power (Marcuse 2005).

3. Lines of social division in Nigeria

3.1. Cultural divisions

Nigeria is a federation, in which the states are organised along linguistic lines. Linguistic differences are mainly cultural differences defined in the event of migration. Though the Nigerian Constitution guarantees freedom of movement and freedom to settle within Nigeria as a fundamental right, migrants face several barriers in their ability to access civic amenities, housing and employment (Babalola 2020). The differences in culture can be easily evident in terms of language, attire or architectural style, which may result in divisions on the basis of ethnicity, tribe, religion or belief and lifestyle.

3.2. Divisions based on functional economic roles

Economic status proves a complicating factor when it comes to determining who is eligible for what. Policymakers and disadvantaged groups are grappling with difficult questions about how and when to consider class when identifying legitimate roles. A. Thorat (2010) associates economic disparities across social groups with unequal and discriminatory access to skills and education, as well as restricted occupational mobility. Further, he points out that poverty is more likely to be a visible symptom of the invisible infliction of social division, exclusion and discrimination by social identity, caste, religion, ethnicity, region and gender. Similarly, a finding suggests that job applicants with a Dalit or Muslim name were considerably less likely to have a positive outcome than an equally qualified person coming from a higher caste name, suggesting stereotypes about certain out-groups as unsuitable for employment. F. Kain (1968) explains that ghetto residents are far from where the urban jobs are located, and the main economic advantage of living in a city is the opportunities an urban area creates for trade and exchange, which are thus beyond the reach of ghetto residents.

3.3. Differences in hierarchical status

The globalisation process deepens the existing inequality structures while forming new inequalities on multiple levels. In fact, globalisation is seen as relations

of power. Class is a widely relevant line of differentiation where income is a good substitute for status and the occupation known as socio-economic status (SES). It is an indicator of an underlying relationship and not a description of the relationship itself.

4. Geographies of discrimination

The Chicago school of sociology, also known as the ecological school of urban sociology, initiated studies on segregation in the 1920s by emphasising the unequal group distribution of households and human behaviour in the urban environment (Wong, Reibel, 2007). The four major frameworks to explain the emergence of segregation have been identified by A. Chung and Y. Brown: assimilation, stratification (by the discriminatory processes), resurgent ethnicity due to group preferences and pluralism (ibidem). L. Wirth (1928: 15) focussed that “the localised aspect of urban communities causes the segmentation of urban life, both because the individual has no conception of the overall scheme of urban life and because urban life tends to be extremely segmented, due to the formation of spatially segregated areas which are likely to be sorted according to colour, ethnic heritage, economic and social status, tastes and preferences”. While the Chicago school, with its urban ecological view, looks at the technological advancements of the city, it overlooked the inequality study.

The field of segregation studies has advocated different themes and measures of segregation. There is there no such agreement on which measure is best to use S. Massey and A. Denton (1988) conceived of residential segregation as a multidimensional phenomenon varying across five distinct areas of measurement, i.e. evenness, exposure, concentration, centralisation and areas. Evenness is related to the differential distribution of two social groups in a city. It is not measured in any absolute sense but is scaled relative to some other group. Exposure is the degree of potential contact between minority and majority group members in the areas of a city. Concentration is the physical space occupied by a minority group in proportion to their population. Groups that dwell in a small area are said to be residentially concentrated. Centralisation refers to the degree to which a group is spatially located near the

centre of an urban area. The concept *clustering* is the extent to which the space inhabited by minority members is connected to one another, or within a space (Denton 1988). The debates on segregation in the early 2000s turned towards black self-segregation.

5. Social identity and change in the spatial structure

Social identity is an analysis or an image that an individual has of themselves; its self-awareness. This suggests that to form a personal idea, the individual must be conscious of *others* who are different from him/her. These distinct differences form its identity. The social identity theory proposed by H. Tajfel (1985) identifies three cognitive processes relevant to a person's being part of an in-group (us) and an out-group (them), i.e. social categorisation, social identification and social comparison. Social categorisation is the process through which the identification of groups is done as to which group an individual belongs. These social categories include religion, caste, as well as social and economic status. A person can belong to more than one group. Social identification is the identity of a group, people have categorised themselves into. If people have categorised themselves as students, they adopt the identity of a student and make compatibility with that. There will be an emotional significance to the identification with a group. Social comparison is the categorisation and identification of a group that leads to a comparison with other groups. The similarities between groups are emotionally laden, leading to in-group as entailing a "competition for positive identity". Outgroup categorisations are strategically framed to maximise self-evaluations (Islam 2014).

Social identity is thus a differentiating mechanism by which individuals establish their own identity based on the perception of *self* and *others*, and it delineates the two. Social identity is thus surrounded by the dualistic construction of *self* and *others*, as well as *us* and *them*. Through this identity, individuals bond together, giving rise to a collective community with similar faith, living style and a common worldview, which provides them with a refuge. Within these communities, inclusionary and exclusionary processes create strong ties and networks of social interaction. Social interaction further articulates the myths and realities of the historical past

and shares a sense of reality and worldview that connects individuals into a totality. The environment generates the process of forming a ghetto, slum, enclave or citadel according to an individual's needs and reality. In short, if an ethnic group is divided into neighbourhoods, it is a *ghetto*; if poor people are living together, it is a *slum*; if an ethnic group voluntarily chooses to reside, it is an *enclave*; and if the rich separate themselves, it forms a *citadel*. While the ghetto is linked with segregation through force, the enclave is segregation through choice.

Social accessibility has been less taken care of, only economic exclusion and inclusion have been considered. Social exclusion and inclusion play an important role in the residential areas of different social groups. Social exclusion highlights the inaccessibility of a buyer, due to their social identity. For example, a Hindu may not like to sell or let his house to a Muslim and vice-versa. Both groups may preferentially treat another member of the same religion by lowering the rent or value of the house or land or giving him/her certain privileges, e.g. allowing him/her to buy the plot in instalments. The information about the sale or rent of a house loses the buyer due to his social identity. Thus, even if the interested buyers can afford to buy a certain space at a particular location, they cannot do so because of the limitations. This shows that residents do not have access to the places they want and irrespected of how much money they have. Instead, the places they have are highly preferred and organised, which leads to a lot of spatial polarisation.

In Nigeria, identity is not solely ascriptive. Technically, there is no end to dissimilarities or differences between individuals and social groups. This suggests that multiple criteria exist on which differences can be based, giving rise to various sources of identities that individuals derive from their sense of self or differences that differentiate one's identity from others. The nature of social identity is *situationally fluid* as described in the social identity theory, meaning that it is subject to modifications and tends to fluctuate. Social identity alters its course according to need. Individuals need to be protected in a cocoon where they can hide and feel safe, because the unfamiliar environment makes them afraid and insecure.

6. Calabar and its Muslims

Nigeria is an ethnically and linguistically diverse country, with over 350 ethnic groups and even more languages spoken within its territory (Ogunmodimu 2015). According to the most recent census, conducted in 2006, the population of Nigeria stood at 140 mln people, making Nigeria the most populated African country. The three largest ethnic groups in the country are the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. Other large ethnic groups include the Ekoi, Edo, Fulani, Ibibio, Idoma, Igala, Ijaw/Izon, Itsekiri, Gwari, Jukun, Kanuri/Beriberi, Nupe, Urhobo and Tiv (ibidem). Muslims constitute about 51% of the overall population, and Christians comprise approximately 47% while almost 1% of the people professes traditional religions (Ogunmodimu 2015). There is no official data on the religious and ethnic composition of the population, but most Muslims constitute a majority in the northern states, while Christians are predominant in the southern states, where the city of Calabar is based.

The Niger Delta is located in the southern part of Nigeria, comprising an area of 70,000 km² that encompasses nine states: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers (Watts 2004). The Niger Delta is crossed by the Niger River, on land covered with swamps, rainforests and woodlands. It is a region extremely rich in natural resources, particularly oil, which was discovered in the 1950s (ibidem). The city of Calabar has been selected as the area of the study. The location has been taken up because the city has been significant in Nigeria for its historical, religious and touristic importance. Calabar city is a major centre of tourism in Nigeria. Also, the city of Calabar is considered the first capital of Nigeria because it served as the first capital of the Southern Protectorate, the Oil River Protectorate, and the Niger Coast Protectorate. Calabar Port on the Atlantic Ocean forms one of the best natural harbours on the West African coast. Therefore it became one of the earliest trading stations for European merchants, who used it to supply their ships with slaves and food items for the American market (Akpanika 2020). Way back in the 15th century, Portuguese sailors had already visited there, as they sailed the West African coast in their quest to find a sea passage to India. Yet it took until 1846 before Scottish Presbyterians founded the first mission station in Calabar. In the following decades, Christianity grew in influence, and this is where the first hospital and the

first post office in the country were opened (ibidem). Today, Calabar is a flourishing trading centre and an administrative hub.

As one of the major urban centres in Nigeria, Calabar has become a place where migrants seeking adventure and livelihood converge, thereby increasing the population of the area. As the population increases, the need to grow the economy and create jobs for the growing residents increases. Hence, the need to develop appropriate and sustainable public policy is also important. As of 2021, Calabar is the 26th largest city in Nigeria in terms of population, sized ca 605,000 inhabitants (Akanika 2020). Calabar has a sizable Muslim population (12.6%), mainly immigrants. While Christianity predominates in Calabar now, the indigenous African religions prevailed before 1846.

The average literacy rate of Calabar City was 69.3% in 2020, compared to 64.7% in 2001 (Isah, Iliyas, 2020). The current scenario of the city of Calabar offers limited opportunities for the disadvantaged sections. Multiculturalism and social mobility have been overlooked, and the Nigerian cities' residential spaces showcase the social and economic realities. Inequality and exclusion are deeply embedded within these structures. Due to the weak structures, the basic governance system is missing, and differences are produced, contested and reproduced.

An increasing trend in identity politics singles out the marginalised sections that seem to be *outsiders* or migrants. There is a widespread movement of identity-based issues where individuals are identified with their caste or religious identities first, which stays with them during migration from rural to urban-based areas. There need to be ways through which urban areas can become more inclusive and liveable. It can happen in two ways. First, addressing "informality" and "right to the city" concerns must be integral parts of urban planning and governance processes that structurally address the issues of exclusion and inequality in India's growing urban spaces. Second, insulating urban governance issues from both the entrenched nexus of real estate barons-politicians-bureaucratic elites as well as the losers from the previous decade of communal and vote bank politics can serve to slow or even reverse the current trend of urban spaces becoming more exclusionary, unaccountable, and unwelcome places for the poorest and most disadvantaged.

In spite of the constitutional recognition of urban governance in the Regional Planning Decree of 1992, the points of urban setting remain unsolved in Nigeria as cities lack the devolving powers of funds, functions and functionaries. There is a need for consciously supported urban inclusive policies that cater to the demands of the disadvantaged sections of society when their identity-based exclusion is neglected and policy responses are processed for them. The debate on the pattern of Muslim housing and the question of self-segregation has become a dominant discourse determining Muslim social space, which can be termed spatial and cultural self-segregation. The issue of spatial segregation revolves around some of the associated issues, which are more inclined towards ethnic residential areaing and “Muslim no-go areas”. It is based on the idea that many Muslims choose to live in separate neighbourhoods and deliberately exclude themselves from society.

J. Eade (2011: 92) highlights that “religious identities are intimately bound up with the process of migration, cultural diversity, and the relationship between geopolitical events at the global and local levels”. Spatial segregation and residential settlement have been into the discourse and are being studied with patterns of racial-ethnic segregation as a group’s spatial position in society is connected to their socio-economic well-being. Resources and opportunities are unevenly distributed in some neighbourhoods with safer streets, high property values, services, effective schools and a more supportive environment than others. As people improve their socio-economic capacity, they gain benefits. By doing so, they transform their socio-economic achievements into better residential areas.

7. The segregation of Muslims in Calabar

One of the most dominant instruments of alienating Muslims from mainstream society is by constructing their identity as “the other”. Muslims are finding new places in exploitation as a result of capitalist accumulation. The question of “good Muslim – bad Muslim” (Mamdani 2005) dual identity, taken from the United States, has been modified for Nigerian conditions. The stereotyping of the two is such that good Muslims are taken as affluent and influential, whereas bad Muslims lack these qualities. It is important to note that some elite Muslims also brought this dis-

course and mentioned that, due to a lack of education, health facilities and education, Muslims are prone to succumbing to violence (Ushe 2012). Thus, the good Muslims thought to distance themselves from the bad Muslims. In reality, everyone aims to be like the Muslims, who are less excluded and get the best of life. Through structural adjustment, the Muslims who are better in terms of monetary gains and educational advancement have distanced themselves from the unorganised masses. Earlier, those differences were not found along the lines of class and identity.

Furthermore, due to the fear of violence, Muslims are concentrated in the ghettos because it gives them the freedom they want to pursue. Ghettos have been maintained due to fear, and a large section of the Muslim population has been living in fear of security. Given the fear of frequent riots, discrimination in housing policies and economic instability, Muslims tend to remain on the periphery in the olden parts of the city, which are developed by lack of development and entrenchment of fear. The civic neglect of the state, discriminatory treatment by its agencies and insecurity among Nigerian Muslims have long been offered as an apparent reason for their marginalisation (Bako, Syed, 2018). Due to the deprivation of resources or lack of access to resources, the Muslim community in Calabar has been facing backwardness, marginalisation, discrimination and violence. The community has been subjected to spatial discrimination, i.e. they are forced to live in ghettos, either for security reasons or due to denial of houses in mixed localities, creating further grounds of inequality. Muslims are fleeing into ghettos due to a sense of security. The areas of Bokobiri and Sabogari in Calabar city are living examples of this, where the areas are reaching the saturation point due to lack of space.

P. Oroz (2005) highlights some factors that have contributed to the spatial segregation: income inequality, low levels of macroeconomic growth, the existence of a small construction industry, a lack of diversity in financial services and poorly functioning public services. Due to a lack of such services, there are problems in buying and renting property for Muslims. G. Jamil (2014) highlights that the identity issue in housing and segregation does not simply stop at the point of intolerance and prejudice but has a material consequence as the owners of the property want their investments to multiply and would resist anything devaluing their investment. They

believe that the Muslim presence in a locality “pollutes” the neighbourhood and brings down prices. This is the reason why Muslims cannot buy a property in certain neighbourhoods that would like to maintain Christian exclusivity in the area where they settle down and are shunned and segregated (ibidem). Scrutinising the issue of representation is very important and it changes the way people think about their identities and how they think about space.

The stereotyping of Muslims remains an essential element in the stigmatisation of Muslims. As E. Goffman (1963; 85) explains, it “seems possible for an individual to fail to live up to what we effectively demand of him, and yet be relatively untouched by this failure; insulated by his alienation, protected by identity beliefs of his own, he feels that he is a full-fledged normal human being, and that we are the ones who are not quite human. He bears a stigma but does not seem to be impressed or repentant about doing so”. The discriminated image comes from the stigma attached to these groups and their deprived identity. E. Edem et al. (2012) explain that the general thesis of Muslim deprivation in Nigeria rests on two counts: (1) on the community’s material dispossession and power deficit, and (2) on the de-recognition of what are held to be constitutive elements of “Muslim culture”.

The concept of a “voluntary ghetto” by L. Wirth (1938) marked the beginning of a long process of isolation. The air of the ghetto was stagnant with ignorance, religious bigotry and fanaticism, which fed on the exclusion from the world outside and the violent persecution. Spatial polarisation has further deepened the differences and has led to the closure of communication channels between people outside the ghetto-forming spaces of relegation. The major points of these spaces of relegation are: (1) an element of social/political constraint over the residential option; (2) class and caste diversity, regrouping individuals according to ethnic and religious identity; (3) the neglect of the state authority in infrastructure and education, the estrangement of the residents from the rest of the areas due to lack of transportation and job opportunities; and (4) the sense of closure among the residents (Wacquant 2007).

As R. Robinson (2005) points out, urban facilities have not found their way into Muslim areas. There are no parks, no widened roads, no recreational facilities, and no modern educational facilities. These are implicitly denied to Muslims because

they are located elsewhere, though on the face of it, they are created for everyone. The making of such places leads to a long-lasting effect, as E. Glaeser (1997) highlights that ghettos create artificial barriers that impede critical opportunities for trade and the exchange of ideas, and this deprives residents. Segregation results in two effects: firstly, it reflects the desire to share a common place with people of the same community for common cultural practices. Grouping and re-grouping have been in practice to protect the religious culture. Secondly, the desire to regroup has become a problem in areas where Muslims are in the minority, and it has become difficult for them to buy property. Furthermore, the feeling of insecurity has risen due to a lack of safety measures as witnessed in the city. Thus, self-segregation leads to unequal access and discrimination, creating a *ghetto effect* (Das 1990).

As Muslims are often found in the older and inner parts of cities where they usually have long histories of residence, the response of the state and the judiciary will be important in such matters. There are ways in which the state could promote pluralistic living. The attempt is not possible without a guarantee of security for those residing in ethnically and culturally varied areas. It is much easier for people to live with individuals of their kind. The real estate markets have expanded their role in exploiting ghettoisation. The latest addition has been the highlighting of the projects on caste/community lines and in places where one can live without the presence of the “other”, which may be another religion or another economic divide. Segregation now has legal backing. The local Muslims feel that their religion, culture, language, institutions, etc. are in danger, and they do not have a “public space” and that whatever public space that exists is monopolised by the religious institutions (Rathore 2012). Thus, cities like Jaipur, which were less affected by communal violence in comparison to Ahmedabad, the fleeing of Muslims to the Muslim dominated areas revealed another ghetto in the process (Glaeser 1997).

R. Gupta (2015) states that the neglect of sectarian relations and its salience in everyday life due to the attention paid to the study of communal relations and critical events marked by violence reinforces the ghetto effect by homogenising Muslims into a singular, undifferentiated category. Thus, to summarise, ghettos are formed in four ways: firstly, when the minorities and people of the ethnic groups voluntarily

choose to live with people of the same kind; secondly, when the majority can afford better living in a more settled area; thirdly, when the majority uses force, as in cases of violence, legal issues and resentment, the minority confides in these areas; and fourthly, poverty may create ghettos where people cannot afford to live anywhere else.

8. Education among Muslims in Calabar: accessibility, affordability and quality

Education enhances the capabilities of an individual. It is a mechanism for enabling active citizenship; thus, those who are denied the right to education face the possibility of having limited chances in the future. M. Zembylas and A. Keet (2019), for instance, argue that meaningful education as a right is key to advancing social justice, as people who are marginalised in education face the prospect of bleak future chances, which truncates their participation in social processes affecting them. On that note, successive governments in Nigeria have at various times, introduced inclusive policies aimed at providing education as a fundamental right of every child. Since the operation of the current Universal Basic Education (UBE) programme, it has recorded visible levels of enrolment. In 2010, the country recorded an 83.3% gross enrolment rate at the primary school level, with male enrolment hitting 87.1% and female 79.3% (Ushe 2012). Despite these figures, a large section of school-aged children in Nigeria are not captured in these numbers as statistics show that over 9 mln *Almajiri* students are presently outside the mainstream school system (Fahm et al., 2021). The *Almajiri* educational system is a religious institution system which encourages parents to leave parental responsibilities of wards to an Islamic school.

After independence, the Nigerian state in the early 1970s took over private and religious schools (both Christian and Muslim) from individuals and communities, as education was regarded as a government venture and not a private enterprise (Ushe 2012). The state, through its policy, emphasised equality of access for all citizens at all levels. However, despite these takeovers and efforts towards inclusion, some Quranic schools, e.g. the *Almajiri* system in Nigeria, have continued to thrive outside the purview of the state by enrolling more pupils of primary school age than

western-styled schools (Kainuwa et al., 2018). A national level strategy by the state in 1999 re-introduced a free and compulsory western-styled education programme for primary and junior secondary school-aged children. The main aims of the programme are to ensure a smooth transition from primary school to junior secondary school and for learners to remain in school long enough to acquire basic life skills. Since the programme was put in place, enrolment rates have gone up, but these figures do not include the Almajiri boys who are not getting enough help from this policy.

The Almajiri schools evolved as an institution highly revered and noted for moral and spiritual education. These schools enjoyed support in pre-colonial times as valued institutions for religious socialisation and social reproduction (Bello et al., 2013). At that time, host communities readily gave alms and accommodation wherever the Mallams (the school owners) and their pupils settled as a form of religious obligation to these bearers of religious knowledge. These schools' owners (Mallams) do not charge fees for their services, and there are no grading systems in place (Awaru et al., 2021). The alleged linkage between *Almajiri* and terrorism has obscured *Almajiri's* long history and its differences. *Almajiri* provides Islamic knowledge in mosques, which provides elementary knowledge to the Muslim children in the Muslim-dominated neighbourhood. An important feature of this system of education is that it is restricted to boys between the ages of four and twelve years. Girls attending these schools are not considered as *Almajiris* and they only attend those Quranic schools near their homes and for shorter periods of time (Osumah 2013). The curriculum of these schools consists of teaching and learning the 60 chapters of the Quran. This curriculum is delivered in the original word and language of God, with an emphasis on the religious duties of Islamic life.

In the city of Calabar, there are currently about five major mosques known to its inhabitants, and this is relatively low compared to the number of Muslims living in the city. It is also estimated that more than half of this population are either children or young adults between the ages of 13 and 21 years. This is because Calabar is predominantly Christian, and a large percentage of Muslims living in the city are either immigrants from core Muslim states in the North or some of the mixed religious

states in the West who came to Calabar for economic reasons. They could also be children of the immigrants. Another reason for the low patronage of students in the *Almajiri* system could be attributed to the systemic stereotype that sees the group as a recruitment ground for violent groups and extremists. This view is largely held by Christians and followers of other religions.

In relation to education, the non-participation of school-aged children in the mainstream education systems by the *Almajiri* faithful in the city of Calabar has some implications. S. Klasen (2001) sees social exclusion in education as when the process of education fails to promote access and equal participation. Though not explicitly defined in Nigeria's 2004 Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) policy, the term *special groups* is used to define the *Almajiris* and other seemingly disadvantaged groups. This therefore connotes the possibility of being outside the mainstream school system and the state's efforts at inclusion through universal policies. The claim that children are excluded from education by the continuous massive violation of education as a right is seen in the exclusion of children who lack access to their rights within and through education. There are many signs and symptoms of a complex web of education-related factors that play a role in how people become excluded on both an individual and societal level. These include not enrolling, being passive, not going to class, repeating, and dropping out.

The above is evident in the low number of Muslims in Western-styled schools in Calabar City. The western-styled school system is presently structured on a 9-3-4 system where the first six years are spent in primary school, the first three years in junior secondary school, and the last three in tertiary institutions. The basic school system, inclusive of early childhood, is offered through private day-care. The first nine years of the basic school system are based on a policy of free and compulsory education for every school-aged child. J. Farrell (2007: 155) sees "schooling (western-styled) as a long-term process in which children may be sorted at many different points and in several different ways, [operating] as a selective social screening mechanism". J. Farrell (2007), through his model of educational inequality, examines schooling and education on the basis of equality. The equality of access (the odds that children of different social groupings will get into the school system), equality of

survival (the chances of children of various social groupings staying and completing a cycle of study), equality of output and outcome (the chances of children of the same social groupings learning the same thing at the same level at a defined point and the possibilities of living relatively similar lives subsequent to schooling). Undocumented reports gotten from the Cross River State Education Board state that there are less than 9% of Muslim students in primary, secondary and tertiary education within the schools in Calabar. This means that young Muslims in the city of Calabar are either part of the *Almajiri* system or do not go to school at all.

9. Why are Muslims losing ground? The focus of the hour

The fallout of Muslims in different spheres has led to a debate on whether Muslims should even exist. From the media framing their identity to mob lynchings, anti-nationalist profiling and scrutiny of their identity, the image of Muslims has been questioned time and again. The recognition of the basic right to housing with regard to quality of life needs to be provided in Muslim-dominated areas. The relationship between Muslims and the Calabar City media has always been complex. Muslims and Islam suffering from a biased press are known to be widely accepted facts. While the media discerns sensitive issues, Muslims are severely affected by the manipulation of images in the media. The reasons are varied. For many, Islam and its adherents are fundamentally opposed to the values they hold dear. On the other hand, many Muslims believe that the non-Muslim media is encouraged by what they believe to be a “conspiracy” against Muslims.

From human rights violations through communal riots to the growing intolerance of sedition charges, Muslims have been at the forefront. The media pick up Muslim men and women randomly and ask their reaction to issues of Islamic rules and happenings about which they have scanty knowledge, and the given answer becomes the new media catch. Fundamentalist, extremist, backward, anti-national and Islamist prefixes have joined the perception of Muslims, forming a hollow politics of divide. The largest minority group in the city of Calabar has been exposed to the nuances of exclusion, inequality and social deprivation, where the stereotyping and negative identity formation have resulted in the denial of resources, stimulating the

“us-versus-them” debate that is already dangerously encompassing in the current environment.

The Muslim communities are in a state of intense political transformation where their national identity is being deconstructed, their factional and ideological lines are getting aggravated, and extremism, radicalism and oppression are widening. In this myriad of identities, one finds Muslims in the city of Calabar nowhere practically but in a state of every affair theoretically. They are harassed, violence and anti-national comments are common, and enforcement of the majority laws on the nation’s new fashion. Muslims who choose to wear their national identity loudly are accepted in the political system as “much accepted” and it is the only identity allowed for them. Paradoxically, by proclaiming and expressing their indifference and raising their voices, Muslims are never heard. The extent of disenfranchisement and harassment is causing an irreparable loss to their already submissive identity. The government’s right attitude toward delivering on the made promises of inclusive governance can rightly ensure that it will never reach the tipping point.

10. Policy implication and recommendations

The treatment of minorities in democracies, especially Nigeria, is by far better than the treatment of them in tyrannical states. However, democracies are formed by majority and state policies, which at times tend to diversify the views and adopt different approaches to deal with an issue, which at times proves incapable. It is not to say that the ideas of democracy and diversity are not important, but the system of elections and the existence of disparity without the ideas of social, economic and political justice make the system void for the minorities. Providing complete schooling in Muslim settlement areas can increase the chances of enrolment, but these policies should be on par with the social policies; otherwise, it can lead to further educational segregation and a difference in the quality of education they will receive.

The demand-driven approach to education needs robust policy design. D. Bolaji et al. (2015) highlight that most of the public policies in Nigeria are formulated with no policy designs. To help solve the problems associated with Muslim education in Calabar, a Ministry of Minority Affairs should be created by the state gov-

ernment to help solve the problems associated with minorities in Calabar City and Cross River State as a whole. Furthermore, the city's social policies can achieve their statutory goals only if they are listed out in the minds of the people. Muslims need to be ensured that they are an essential part of the city and schemes are being implemented exclusively for them. This will, in turn, reduce their thoughts of being separated and excluded. The proposed creation of the Ministry of Minority Affairs could come up with counselling sessions in schools to make them aware of the approaches and measures being followed for them.

To achieve the goals, policymakers must provide adequate resources and affordable access to facilities for Muslim children to attend school. S. Devarajan and R. Reinikka (2004: 122) highlight that "the goal of school autonomy and accountability is to create a system in which organisational providers have strong, sustained incentives to improve outputs". Where the practice of discrimination or bullying in the name of one's religion is being noted, authorities need to be sensitive towards this situation. Fostering diversity and exposure to all religions through interfaith interactions can address the queries of students. The schools in the city of Calabar may come up with a zero-tolerance policy towards any kind of malaise. Muslim research scholars and people who are in some position to create a difference in the lives of the community can also provide useful policy input and develop means to promote growth in the current status of Muslim faithful education. To encourage harmony within these spheres, school management committees may take necessary policy steps at the initial level itself.

Indeed, education can be a panache for development among Muslims in the city of Calabar. They experience a long-standing rift between conservative ideology, on the one hand, and liberal and leftist ideology, on the other. The government should look into the matter of exclusion among Muslims in all walks of life. It is high time Muslims needed to come out of their comfort zone, stop believing that they will be targeted, and proceed towards a more secular modern education. For this to happen, the government must open up spaces for children at least until the twelfth class, so that none of the children drop out of school on the pretext of going far away from their house. A strong rapport should be built based on a congenial environment

among students and teachers at school. Provision of skills-based work along with formal education and encouragement to participate in the system may be given to socially excluded children and religious minorities. It comes as a sense of urgency for the Muslim community to understand the power of education and work towards development rather than quibbling about beards, veils and infighting among sects.

11. Conclusion

This study sought to understand the dynamics and processes of exclusion, paying close attention to various indicators, e.g. geographies of discrimination, issues of access and the problem of segregation of Muslims in the city of Calabar. The location of a neighbourhood significantly determines the levels of access to services, the critical element in bridging the gaps in the strength of urban governance institutions. The trend of Nigeria's ongoing urbanisation offers little opportunity for the inclusion of its marginalised populations. Nigeria still has a long way to go before its cities become places where people can move up the social ladder.

Equal access to social rights can only be achieved if dealt with through inclusion in social, political, cultural and economic spheres. Social exclusion is a complex collection of conditions, many of which are created within the social environment. The issue of minoritarianism is fast becoming a means of exclusion and can only be overcome through the right kind of public policymaking for the excluded. A popular theme on the subject of public policy is *implementation*. When a policy is designed, it attempts to focus on its cycle, but it loses its focus on the central theme of implementation, which is the heart of the public policy process. The right public policy can further help in overcoming inequality.

Affirmative action has always been a controversial issue for Muslims. The term *affirmative action* refers to a policy aimed at increasing workplace or educational opportunities for underrepresented parts of society (Premdas 2016). Unless the city becomes more responsive towards the needs of minorities, the inclusionary measures will not be a success. S. Alam (2014) rightly points out that the issue of affirmative action for Muslims is complicated for two reasons: (1) the vast institutional deficit with regard to representation as well as the socio-economic backwardness of Muslims as

a whole, and (2) it shows that the community is differentiated and divided into sub-groups and caste groupings which have different capacities to access opportunities. Public policy needs to play an active role in promoting the rights of minorities. Further, affirmative action should not be taken up as a substitute for reservations. It is time to realise that different groups need to be dealt with differently regarding their marginalisation. Muslims need affirmative action to increase their representation and, furthermore, to remove their backwardness in the city.

12. References

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Wpłynęło/received 17.01.2022; poprawiono/revised 23.02.2022

**Near abroad Russian foreign and domestic policy
in the first decade of the twenty first century**

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Acknowledgements

The authors appreciate the editorial assistance offered by the “Przestrzeń Społeczna (Social Space)” journal towards the successful completion of this article.

Abstract

The rise of a new Russia after the sudden demise of the Soviet Union is an unprecedented development in the 21st century and, as such, it has rightly attracted attention all over the world, including researchers and scholars. Russia’s foreign policy has undergone significant changes since 1991. In the long run, foreign policy always depends on domestic policy. In the case of Russia, this has been particularly true ever since the collapse of the USSR. Russia has emerged as a totally different type of statehood than its predecessor. Domestic factors have influenced Russian foreign policy in various ways. Firstly, internal economic, social, military and political plans are competing with foreign policy plans for the limited resources available to the state. Second, though Marxism-Leninism continues to have some degree of influence on the foreign policy of Russia, it is no longer the official ideology but one of several contending conceptual approaches. This research looks at how Russia sees its relationships with its neighbours, whom it commonly refers to as “the near abroad” (*blizhnee zarubezhye*) – a phrase that implies a lack of actual independence – and how it sees those connections in terms of its imagined sphere of influence. This study is a modest attempt to probe Russia’s behaviour in contemporary international politics, specifically to explain the reason behind Ukraine’s invasion. The behaviour of the new Russia in international politics is of immense importance for understanding post-cold war international politics.

Keywords: Soviet Union, Russia, Russian foreign policy, *Realpolitik*.

1. Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the most dramatic, unexpected and defining moments in the political development of the 20th century. The Soviet Union, officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was a constitutionally socialist state that existed in Eurasia from 1922 until 1991. It was one of the world’s two superpowers, along with the United States, from 1945 until its break-up in 1991. The USSR was founded and extended as a union of Soviet republics formed inside the territory of the Russian Empire, which was overthrown by the 1917 Russian Revolution, followed by the 1918-1920 Russian Civil War. The Soviet Union’s political

boundaries changed over time, but after the last major territorial annexations of eastern Poland, Finish Karelia, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and certain other territories during the second world war, the boundaries roughly corresponded to those of late Imperial Russia from 1945 until dissolution, with the notable exceptions of Poland and Finland.

During the cold war, the Soviet Union became the principal model for future communist nations; the Soviet governance and political structure were established by the sole authorised political party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By 1956, the USSR was composed of 15 union republics. When the USSR crumbled at the end of 1991, disintegrating into 15 sovereign, independent states, it marked the end of an era in international relations (Marples 2016). The ideological war between the socialist and capitalist camps became merely a matter of academic speculation rather than a decisive consideration in international relations. It was also the official end of the bipolar world that had sustained and nourished international relations in general, and political alliances in particular, ever since the second world war. As the legal heir to the old Soviet Union's position, the Russian Federation, led by President B. Yeltsin, inherited all of the Soviet Union's international rights, advantages and duties (Rutland 2010). More importantly, however, for policymakers, it inherited a dramatically different geopolitical context than the tsarists and Soviet authorities faced. Not only had the external situation changed, but the home picture had also shifted beyond the Russian political elite's comprehension. And, like his predecessors – from the tsars to J. Stalin, N. Khrushchev, L. Brezhnev and M. Gorbachev – B. Yeltsin had to adapt to new conditions. Especially when it came to foreign policy, which had to take into account both external and internal forces.

Russia had never been a nation-state; rather, it had been a multinational empire with messianic aspirations during both the tsarist and Soviet periods. Russian identity is torn between the ethnic Russian (*russskiy*) community and *rossiyskiy* which implies Russian citizens regardless of ethnicity or religious affiliation. Both terms are translated into English as *Russian*, but there is a vast difference between *russskaya zemlya* (Russian land) and *Rossiyskaya Federatsiya* (Russian Federation) because *russskiy* describes something that belongs to the Russian ethnos, whereas *rossiyskiy* “describes

something belonging to the Russian state” (Fridman 2021: 73). Thus, *russskiy* is regarded as ethnic Russian by anyone who belongs to the Russian ethnos, an East Slavic ethnic group that comprise about 80% of the total Russia’s population. On the other hand, the word *rossiyane* refers to all citizens of Russia.

The fall of the communist empire left a “hole” in the new Russian Federation’s foreign policy, which brought up the question of Russia’s national identity (Odey, Bassey, 2022). There was no precedent to follow. And psychologically, the hangover of being a global superpower was all too strong to be ignored. Furthermore, the security dilemmas confronting Russia have changed drastically in both its internal and external environments. At the centre of all policy considerations by Moscow are these new security concerns of the new Russian state. Externally, the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include the former allies of the USSR was perceived as the most potent threat to Russian security (Waltz 2000). Even after more than a decade and some good news from the Russian point of view, NATO expansion is still perceived as a big threat to Russia’s security.

However, the most complex of all the problems that Russia faced immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union was its relationship with its newly independent neighbours, the former Soviet republics, or what has been termed as the near abroad (*blizhnee zarubezhnye*). In dealing with the countries of the near abroad, the new Russian state had to grapple with the historical legacies of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union – polities in which Russia had often played a leading and oppressive role in the non-Russian regions. Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the near abroad region was engulfed by many conflicts that were to have a significant impact on Russian foreign policy towards the region. There were territorial, leadership, economic, diaspora and military conflicts. Important among the territorial conflicts were the status of territories and borders in Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), the Trans-Dniester area (Moldova) and Crimea (Ukraine), and recently the entire Ukraine. Then there was the use of force in power struggles in Georgia, Tajikistan and even the Russian Federation itself. One of the critical economic issues was compensation for Russian energy sources, as well as the division of former Soviet debt, the introduction of new currencies and customs regulations, and

the termination of common prices and financial transfers across the borders of near abroad countries (Medvedev 2015). Military conflicts include the division of former Soviet military assets (Black Sea Fleet, nuclear weapons, installations and bases) and the Russian military's presence in the near abroad.

The diaspora conflicts were centred on the status and future of approximately 25 mln ethnic Russians living outside the borders of the Russian Federation. Such a scenario on the Russian Federation's borders posed a formidable challenge to Russia's foreign policymakers. Overnight, what used to be a matter of domestic policy, suddenly became a concern of foreign policy. However, neither the mechanisms nor the expertise were present in the foreign policy structure; rather, they were spread throughout the domestic bureaucracies. It was time to experiment with different concepts and institutions. It was time to build new relationships based on new national interests rather than ideological considerations.

2. The evolution of Russian foreign policy

When the Soviet Union disintegrated into 15 independent nations at the end of December 1991, the Russian Federation was faced with massive problems and complicated issues – both internal and external. In that backdrop, the emergence of Russian foreign policy must be understood. These issues and problems were to serve as the foundation for Russia's new foreign policy. Viewed historically, the decisive turning point in foreign policy thinking was the transition from the imperial and ideological paradigms of the L. Brezhnev era to the paradigms of New Thinking under M. Gorbachev. Externally, in the international arena, M. Gorbachev set a trend in the late 1980s by which the USSR willingly reduced its commitments to the outside world, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Grachev 2018). Also, it had started cutting down on its presence in East Central Europe by disbanding the Warsaw Pact and withdrawing its troops from those countries. Though much of the impetus behind these historic decisions had to do with the internal conditions of the Soviet Union, in particular the economic collapse, this had a very dramatic impact on the USSR, that lost its international standing as a superpower. The new Russian Fed-

eration under Boris Yeltsin had to keep this changed scenario in mind while formulating its foreign policy paradigm and framework.

The second important external development was the end of the cold war and the apparent ideological rapprochement with the West, especially the United States. M. Gorbachev called Europe “our common home”; his *perestroika* and *glasnost* were reflections of the rapprochement of the two earlier antagonistic systems of ideologies. It was clear that M. Gorbachev’s USSR had started to look towards the West as a model for socio-economic and political development. As A. Kozyrev, B. Yeltsin’s first foreign minister, was to accept later, “The past ten years (i.e. 1982-1992) have not been a period of eclipse, but a period of struggle against the inhuman communist regime” (Dembińska, Mérand, 2021: 63). “Russia [...] used all of its might to defeat the (communist) party and rejoin the rest of the world on the path to civilization. The logical conclusion of this struggle would be Russia’s unification with the West” (Lynch 2002: 164). In other words, the ideological antagonism between the West and the new Russian Federation already belonged to the past when the time came for Moscow to formulate its new foreign policy. It was now a question of how rapidly Moscow would adopt the new ideology as the basic paradigm of its new foreign policy. Internally, there was a total breakdown of the economic as well as administrative system in Russia. Also, the huge foreign policy establishment in Moscow had largely disintegrated with the USSR. What remained were mainly lower and middle-level functionaries who had quickly changed their tags and turned democratic. In other words, Russia suddenly found itself devoid of an experienced group of foreign policymakers. What remained were those whose only qualifications appeared to be as active supporters and cheerleaders of President B. Yeltsin in his drive against the socialist system in the country and the USSR as a whole.

Politically, there was a power struggle before B. Yeltsin was finally able to consolidate his position a couple of years later, by means that have not always been appreciated. Another major problem that Russia faced immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the influx of ethnic Russians from the near abroad countries, especially the non-Slavic countries. Added to these millions, were thousands of military men from Eastern Europe. In other words, Russia was faced with a refugee

problem of tremendous proportions. As this work has shown, the issue of ethnic Russians settled in other near abroad countries, numbering an estimated 25 mln, became a major issue for Russian foreign policymakers in the following years (Zevelëv 2001). Also, at a different level, the loss of superpower status had left the Russians with a loss of identity. Moscow's subsequent foreign policy had a lot to do with trying to revitalise the Russian identity and regain some form of superpower status.

3. The crisis of Russian identity

During the early years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has been grappling with the loss of its identity. More than half a century of superpower status has left some permanent psychological impressions on the minds of the Russian people. The political elite has to cater to this craving for a new identity among the people – at least subtly, if not overtly. Though there have been some Russian leaders who have insisted on retaining the “superpower” status. Instead, most policy documents have tried to deliberately and strongly reinforce the position of Russia as a “regional power”, deserving its rightful place in international politics (Mankoff 2009). The Russian Federation's vacillation in foreign policy stems in large part from the difficulties Russians have encountered in defining their national identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This search for a new identity has played a significant role in determining the course of Russian foreign policy, at least in the first few years of the post-USSR period. While all other former Soviet republics benefited from the Soviet Union's demise, Russia has suffered overall. Moscow has lost an empire and all the benefits that apparently go with it. The collapse has been a setback for the pride of the Russians. The new realities and the degraded status have been hard to digest.

The obvious reliance on Western financial aid has hurt the sentiments of the Russians, especially the more patriotic lot. One of the cardinal questions of Russian national identity is whether “Russia as a civilization embraces only the Russian Federation or [whether] it also includes Ukraine and Belarus” (Wolczuk 2000: 678). For many Russians, the Soviet Union rather than the Russian FSSR was their homeland, the more so that the latter was purely formal rather than actual polity, the non-

existence of the Communist Party of the RFSSR being the best example. It is not surprising that it has been difficult in the post-Soviet era to limit the Russian national consciousness to the boundaries of the Russian Federation. In fact, opinion polls in Russia have consistently shown that a majority of Russians do not see Ukrainians and Belarusians as separate ethnic groups, but as somehow Russian. This fact stems from the traditional Russian terminology, in which adjective *ruskiy* applies both to Russia and (Kievan) Rus'. These considerations have influenced Russian foreign policy toward the near abroad. In recent months, Russia has been actively pursuing some sort of Slavic Union by incorporating both Belarus and Ukraine, oblivious to the fact that only the extreme left in Ukraine supports such a move. However, a movement to support the Union of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (ZUBR) is active in all three countries and Moldova. As a result, the question of what is Russia, and who are the Russians, has had significant consequences in Russian foreign policy toward the near abroad. Since the Russian Federation inherited a certain legacy from the former Soviet Union, it is imperative to know the basic foundations of foreign policy during the Soviet era to understand Russia's foreign policy in the post-Soviet period.

4. The role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy

For more than seven decades, the USSR was one of the two pillars of the bipolar world, the other being the United States of America (USA). It was the most prominent player in the cold war that dominated most of the twentieth-century international politics. Most countries during the Soviet era were either pro-USSR or anti-USSR. One either looked up to the Soviet ideology with great reverence or looked down on it with greater contempt. Indeed, both political thinkers and Soviet practitioners were drawn to the ideological component of the Soviet polity. Ideology has been considered the cornerstone of the former Soviet Union. Only during the Soviet period was the prevailing idea encompassed in an official ideology, Marxism-Leninism. According to S. White (1988: 1), "there has been general agreement that official ideology plays a central role in Soviet politics". Z. Brzeziński also avers that "the persisting and important role of ideological assumptions in the thinking and actions of Soviet leaders" (Brzezinski 1962:132), is "essential to an understanding of

their conduct of foreign policy” (ibidem). C. Hunt (1960: 107) explains that the foreign policy attitudes of the Soviet leadership “are not simply based on Marxist-Leninist ideas in some abstract sense – they are soaked into its bones”.

One major example is that the influence of Karl Marx’s internationalist theme on the thoughts and actions of the Soviet Union could be clearly seen during the first world war. K. Marx stated that “workingmen have no country” (Marx, Engels, 1967). In other words, K. Marx replaced “national loyalty” with the “common interest” of the international working class. V. Lenin’s theory of imperialism also states that the task of a world socialist revolution could be successfully accomplished by turning the “imperialist world war” into a series of civil wars (Lenin 1965). Thus, Marxist thought extended by V. Lenin’s doctrine of imperialism provided the theoretical justification for the conclusion that the most effective course of action for the proletariat from the Marxist point of view during the first world war would be to turn weapons against its own government rather than support this government by fighting fellow proletarians from other countries. As V. Lenin summarised this position, “A revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot but desire the defeat of its own government” (Erdogan 2020: 66). Although this tactical conclusion already possessed a theoretical basis in the general tradition of European Marxism, only Russian Marxists, namely Bolsheviks, had enough faith in this tradition to base their actions on its premises. Thus, the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party controlled by the Bolsheviks issued, in September 1914, a “manifesto against the war, declaring that the task of socialism was to turn the conflict into a civil war. The Manifesto called upon the socialists of each country to defeat their own bourgeoisie” (Moore 2017: 56).

Furthermore, the Soviet political elite’s verbal communications about the goals, instruments and implementation of foreign policy also made a crucial contribution to the basis on which this assertion was built. In other words, foreign policy was based on statements of Soviet leaders, who constantly claimed to act in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. P. Tugwell (1984: 31-32), for example,

saw verbal communications of Soviet leaders as open statements about their exact intentions and the motives behind their actions:

that the CPSU “has time and time again proved its fidelity” to [V.] Lenin’s behest that the Soviet government set a higher value on the world dictatorship of the proletariat and the world revolution than on all national sacrifices, burdensome as they are. Or Yuri[y] Andropov, who was presumably praising his then boss, Leonid Brezhnev, said in a 1982 speech that the chairman’s name was linked “to the triumph of the magnificent cause: the victory of communism throughout the world”. From an analysis of Soviet morality, ideology and military power, [P.] Tugwell reached the conclusion that Marxist internationalism was “the overriding factor in Soviet foreign and defence policy”. “I think”, he wrote, “that internationalism may be pushed onto the back burner from time to time, but even there, it continues to brew as circumstances allow. I think that the apparatus of state and the might of the Soviet armed forces are servants of the party in the cause of world revolution. They do not indicate a change of aim, only a modernization of method.

This continued to remain the primary driving force – not the basic rationale – for the very existence of the Soviet Union for more than seventy years. Without a revolutionary theory, there could be no revolutionary movement. Internally, the ideology was revered (or so it appeared to be to outside observers) – (Burbank 1989). Externally, it was held in awe and fear. It was, hence, no surprise that the omnipotent and omnipresent ideology had its impact in the realm of Soviet foreign policy as well. Soviet scholars, politicians and policymakers have often insisted that their foreign policy was based on the Marxist-Leninist ideology. In fact, some scholars have sought to differentiate Soviet foreign policy from Western foreign policies on this ideological ground. The way theory is made in the West and how it is used in the West is very different from how it is used in the Soviet Union.

Due to the pluralist nature of their polities (polity scheme), the Communist Party’s monopoly prevented any alternative. The Marxist-Leninist philosophy was the first and last word. There was no tradition of criticism of either the theory or its practise in the Soviet Union. This stringent control of the Communist Party over ideological matters produced fatal rigidity in policy formulation and was to prove decisive in the collapse of the Soviet Union during the early nineties of the 20th century

(Li 2018). Outside observers, however, have questioned the actual role of ideology in the Soviet Union. Some believe that politics in the erstwhile USSR was more a matter of power than of ideology. They have been highly critical of the often revered and indispensable theory–practice relationship of the Soviet elite. For them, such a relationship never existed. And if it ever did, it was more of a matter of convenience than real ideological convictions. For many, Marxism has often become simply a rhetorical device for the *Realpolitik* (a political system or set of ideas based on practical factors rather than moral or idealistic ones) of the Soviet Union. Others believe that Soviet foreign policy was pragmatic rather than idealistic or ideological. On the other hand, however, inside the Soviet Union, a distinction between theory and practise would not be accepted in Soviet philosophy. This belief about an ideological foundation gives credence to this belief.

The truth, however, lies between the two extreme views. There is little doubt that Soviet foreign policy was ideologically driven. M. Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* programmes were to usher in a dramatic shift in the ideological underpinnings of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. For the first time in the history of the socialist empire, the Marxist-Leninist ideology as the foundation of foreign policy was questioned. M. Gorbachev's *perestroika*, in its dynamics and evolution, was an attempt to resolve the problem of national security on a fundamentally new basis. With his buzzwords of democracy and market reforms, he sought to change the image of the USSR to suit the Western world. Not only externally, in dealing with the world at large, M. Gorbachev sought to use democracy as the key component. As a result of M. Gorbachev's initiatives, "the union state, which was federative only nominally, while remaining essentially unitarian, was to have obtained more of a federative substance" (Starr 1995: 19), as a result of his initiatives. "New Thinking" was primarily designed for foreign policy matters, but it was not confined to them for long.

5. Bolsheviks, the nationality question and the federal set-up

The nationalist composition of the tsarist Empire (Imperial Russia that spanned Eurasia beginning in 1721, replacing the Tsardom of Russia) was the culmination of a long process of territorial expansion and colonisation (Martin 2001). The

conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan by Ivan the Terrible added Volga Tatars to the empire; Siberian expansion in the 17th century added Mongols, and other smaller groups to the empire's populace; and by the early 18th century, the Dnieper population of Eastern Slavs Cossacks had become part of the vast Tsarist Empire. While Peter the Great shifted his borders towards the Baltic region, Catherine pushed towards Turkey and the Black Sea (Kollmann 2016). In the early 19th century, Georgia, Finland and Poland were added. By the mid-nineteenth century, the remaining Transcaucasian regions were incorporated (Burbank 2006).

One of the most urgent problems faced by the new Bolshevik government in the post-1917 period was how to deal with the various nationalities that inhabited the territory of the tsarist Empire. From the very beginning, commentators predicted that the Bolsheviks would find it impossible to control the varied and innumerable national groups that they had inherited from the tsars. For the Bolsheviks, the nationality issue was what V. Lenin called the "burning question" that needed immediate attention. And they sought to deal with it through a constitutional federal set-up – an idea traditionally abhorred by the Marxists, who considered it a retrograde development. Before the revolution, V. Lenin simply rejected federalism. Although he was a staunch advocate of national self-determination (as he understood it), he insisted that federalism and self-determination were not to be confused. The idea of a nation-based federalism had been rejected at the Minsk Congress in 1898, as well as at the January Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSLDP) in 1912 (Nahaylo et al., 1999). V. Lenin often expressed his views against federalism and decentralisation. He ridiculed the idea that federalism and democracy were structurally linked. Despite the theoretical abhorrence of the concept, the world's first socialist state was to become a federal state. After the revolution, V. Lenin realised that the yearning for national representation was a potent political resource that could be exploited even if it meant compromising his principled stand against federalism and decentralisation (Feeley, Rubin, 2009). In the end, V. Lenin's acceptance of federalism was purely tactical. V. Lenin saw federalism as the surest step to the most solid unification of the different nationalities of Russia into a single, democratic, centralised Soviet state. He saw federalism as a political force that could allay the fears of different

nationalities towards allegiance to central Soviet rule. He was convinced that when the time came, the federal form would simply wither away.

The Bolsheviks did not intend for the federal structure to be a permanent organisational feature of socialism. It was only to be a stage or phase on the path to a unified socialist society. The ground realities of Russia in the early 20th century put considerable restraints on Marxist theories and political expediency dictated terms to the Bolsheviks. Hence, the principle of “national statehood” eventually became enshrined as a fundamental principle of Soviet socialist federalism. Their views on federalism underwent a complex process of evolution from rejection in principle to its acceptance as the most suitable form of organising a multinational state. Of primary significance is how V. Lenin personally sought to use the federal concept to handle the complex nationality issue in the infancy of the USSR. The formulas (sic) of Leninist nationality policy continue to be invoked in the USSR as the rationale and intellectual basis for present-day policies regarding nationalities. Even M. Gorbachev, the architect of the USSR’s collapse, swore by Leninist ideas on the issue, at least initially. Hence, Soviet leaders, starting from V. Lenin to M. Gorbachev, adopted both a theoretical as well as a practical component in their policies (Koslowski, Kratochwil, 1994). While the former derived heavily from Marxist theories, the latter was influenced by their own experience and sense of political expediency. V. Lenin believed that nationalist consciousness and enmity, especially during the tsarist period, were a result of oppression. He professed that once the source of that oppression was removed through the establishment of a socialist state, the nationalist consciousness and enmity would give way to a proletarian consciousness pervading all nationalities. According to V. Lenin, just like the *state*, national identities would wither away with the establishment of socialism.

6. V. Lenin and self-determination

Though V. Lenin was not immune to the early twentieth-century trend toward national self-determination, he was a statesman capable of bending the right to self-determination to fit Russian realities. For V. Lenin, self-determination meant offering a temporary concession to nationalist sentiments in exchange for political support for

socialism (Suny 1990). V. Lenin fashioned an interpretation of national self-determination that offered the national group a voluntary and free choice to join the Bolshevik ranks. Once the offer was accepted, the “right” to direct and control their national destinies was quickly assumed by the party. Hence, the right to self-determination became a one-time choice rather than a legal right to continuing self-government. If you offered them self-determination, they would not use it; if you denied them the right, they would demand it. National autonomy as interpreted by V. Lenin included the following: the right to self-determination and secession; the formation of independent governments for national groups; and full legal, political and economic equality of all nations in the spheres of social and political life of the country (Mancini 2008). The existence of a single party as an organisation of the proletariat and the principle of “democratic centralism” within the party would, according to V. Lenin’s perception, keep nationalist sentiments in check. It was only during his end-days that he realised his government was promoting the forced assimilation of different nationalities into the Soviet Union rather than the gradual, natural one he had anticipated. Perhaps his last attempt at arresting the aberrations and implementing his ideas included his interdicting J. Stalin’s attempt to concentrate economic commissariats in Moscow in the draught of the Treaty of the Soviet Union of 1922 (Mawdsley 1998). V. Lenin forced J. Stalin to change the draft, but when the time came for its implementation, V. Lenin had already died.

V. Lenin’s nationalities policy was the founding stone on which subsequent Moscow Republic relationships were built. The periphery states often cited V. Lenin’s policy to demand further rights and also used it as a shield against the overbearing policies of the centre. As J. Critchlow notes, it has been a standard practise for the defenders of minorities’ rights to use Leninist quotations “to buttress every argument for national rights” (Amato et al., 2018: 128). On the other hand, the opponents of national rights always argued that V. Lenin was essentially an integrationist. They believed that V. Lenin’s purpose for managing nationality relations was national integration. The property-oriented, territorial principle of political organisation was antagonistic to Marxist communism. Such an ideological explanation made it easier for the Bolsheviks to deny individual rights, the rights of localist parties and

the rights of territorial governments. Hence, once again ideology came to Moscow's rescue and that it was used to bind the far-flung republics to the centre. However, the Soviet leaders could not afford to fully ignore the nationalist sentiments. Hence, they sought to harness the prevailing political forces by combining nationalist sentiments with the attenuated political institutions of the territorial federation. This became the root compromise of the Soviet Socialist Federation, which was essentially a hybrid of nationalist and territorial principles.

7. New approaches to foreign policy

The dominant Marxist-Leninist ideology, which was the cornerstone of Moscow's foreign policy for more than seven decades, started to lose appeal during the M. Gorbachev regime. For all practical purposes, it ceased to exist after the official collapse of the USSR. The collapse of the monopolistic, all-pervading socialist ideology gave rise to several competing concepts in the realm of Russian foreign policy. Like true neophytes, just about anyone and everyone proposed a viable and effective model of dealing with the new situation. While some advocated a complete break away from the past, others refused to accept the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Some, on the other hand, proposed a middle path that recognised the new realities but suggested gradual progress into the future. The conflicting concepts and approaches to Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet period reflected a genuine crisis for the policymakers – first identifying new national interests and then establishing the mechanisms to achieve and protect those. In short, Russia's foreign policy in the first few years after the fall of the Soviet Union was based on three main ideas, to be discussed below.

8. The Atlanticists, Eurasianists and Russian nationalists

One of the first and most significant concepts was that advocated by the *Atlanticists* or *Westerners* (Shlapentokh 2014). It centred around the idea that Russia would make a complete break with Soviet foreign policy since that was based primarily on ideological considerations. They wanted to link Russia's foreign policy to Russia's goal of becoming a normal capitalist state linked to its place in Europe (Tsygankov

2019). The *Atlanticists* advocated a blatantly pro-Western approach in the hope of becoming part of the liberal, democratic Western world. The leader of this group was independent Russia's first foreign minister, A. Kozyrev, a young professional diplomat who had spent sixteen years in the Department of International Organisations of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Having served under M. Gorbachev for a considerable period, he had come to admire and support the latter's "new thinking". Not surprisingly, he vehemently advocated Russia's participation in international institutions. He purported to rid Russia of decades of over-reliance on military instruments and develop foreign policy ideas focused on the promotion of human rights and universal values of global economic, environmental and nuclear security to be realised through a community of democratic states. During the early months of 1992, K. Yeltsin and Deputy Prime Minister E. Gaidar, who were spearheading the drastic economic reforms in Russia, consistently voiced these "liberal westernising" views of Russia's national interests. For them, Western democracies were the ideal model and partner for Russia. The *Atlanticists* were criticised for blindly toeing the US line on giving economic aid (Jain 2003). They were particularly pinned for their support of the United States on issues of arms control and the war in Bosnia. As a result of the ensuing debates and criticisms, some other competing approaches came to be heard within the Russian government in the spring and summer of 1992. Foremost among them was the voice of the *Pragmatic Nationalists*, or the *Eurasianists*.

The *Eurasianists* advocated continuity with the Soviet past without antagonism or conflict with the USA and the West in general. The *Eurasianists* were hostile to NATO and believed that Russia's primary interests should lie in its relationships with its neighbours (Morozova 2009). As opposed to the *Atlanticists*, they held that Russia was indeed separate and distinct from the West. The presidential advisor, S. Stankevich, was one of the strongest advocates of this approach. This school of thought did not reject the West but called for a balanced policy, although the immediate urgency was to heighten the emphasis on the East rather than the West. They also called for tougher talks to defend the Russian population and Russian heritage in other former republics of the Soviet Union. As a Russian equivalent to the Monroe Doctrine of the United States, one of B. Yeltsin's advisors, A. Migranian, wrote in

August 1992: “Russia should declare to the world that the entire geopolitical space of the former USSR is a space of its vital interests” (Donaldson, Nadkarni, 2018: 119). The *Eurasianists* did not advocate forcible revision of the boundaries of the Russian Federation. They, however, disagreed with A. Kozyrev and Y. Gaidar in arguing that Russia needed to foster a closer relationship with the republics of the former Soviet Union, which were Russia’s newest neighbours.

The third approach that became extremely popular was that advocated by the *Russian Nationalists*. The advocates of this approach refused to accept the demise of the Soviet Union. They claimed the collapse to be a mistake and believed in the inevitability of the rebirth of the Soviet Union. At the helm of this category belonged V. Zhirinovsky, leader of the misleadingly titled Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – a neo-fascist party that surprised everyone with its showing in the parliamentary elections of December 1993 (Umland 2010). Other proponents included G. Ziuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation; A. Prokhanov, of the extremist newspaper “Den”, and Colonel V. Alksnis, leader of the reactionary Soyuz fraction in the Congress of People’s Deputies.

This group sought to recreate the Soviet Union, even by force if necessary. They were blatantly anti-Western and opposed the integration of the Russian economy into the world economy. They were the twentieth-century heirs to the Slavophiles, contemptuously denouncing those who thought Western culture or political institutions were worthy of imitation and praising Russian civilisation as distinctive and superior. Though in the end, their policies turned out to be more hollow rhetoric than substance, the Russian Nationalists did find popular support among the dissatisfied, fallen-from-grace Russian citizens. It was a clear sign that A. Kozyrev’s romantic overtures to the US-led West were losing their appeal.

9. V. Putin’s Russia and the near abroad

V. Putin assumed office as the second president of Russia on the 7 May 2000, though he had been the acting president since January of that year. V. Putin inherited a curious mixture of success and failure in the realm of foreign policy from his predecessor, B. Yeltsin. B. Yeltsin had succeeded in solving some very complex issues,

like settling various issues with Ukraine and the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russian soil. He attempted to reassure the nations of Russia's near abroad of their independence – a key irritation and source of distrust in Russia's ties with these countries. On the other hand, however, he was unable to establish mutual trust among most of the former Soviet republics. His approach to the near abroad was erratic at best. His frequent changes in foreign ministers reflected a lack of confidence in his approach to the former Soviet space. Apart from the legacy that he inherited from B. Yeltsin, V. Putin's accession to power was marked by three significant events that were to later play an important role in determining his policy towards the near abroad.

First was NATO's expansion towards the east and the subsequent war in Kosovo (Hendrickson 2000). To Russians, these were the embodiments in Russia of the US-led effort to isolate Russia and ignore her legitimate security concerns. The second was the outset of another war in Chechnya. This time around, the war had stopped being just a secessionist movement and argued to be a war on Islamic fundamentalists and international terrorism. The third event was the financial collapse of the ruble in 1998 (Senchagov, Mityakov, 2016). Despite the currency meltdown, there was no help forthcoming from the international community through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international lenders who were pouring billions of Russian rubbles into Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil as well as other countries. These experiences underscored the harsh reality that V. Putin and the political elite internalised: the international community could not be counted on to help Russia rebuild its economy, provide security reassurances or support Moscow's attempt to thwart the rise of Muslim extremism. In other words, Russia, as they saw it, was essentially alone. Hard-nosed and unromantic pragmatism were now the Russian watchwords. There were to be no more "free lunches" for energy-starved countries of the former Soviet Union. And more effort needed to be placed on bilateral relations rather than trying to find group consensus through mechanisms such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). And so, Russia would have to pursue its interests and define its friends according to "what's in it for Russia".

During the March 2000 presidential election campaign, V. Putin refused to outline his policy programme in any detail or debate other candidates, but he took positions on some issues. He called for a strong and stable Russia, fighting crime and enforcing law and order (exemplified by fighting Chechen terrorists as convenient scapegoats). He stressed that “the stronger the state, the freer the individual” (Donaldson, Nadkarni, 2018: 78), trying to equate safety and freedom. He also argued that a strong state is “part of Russia’s genetic code” (Baev 2006: 5). Though lacking in clarity, these statements gave ample indications of where V. Putin wanted to take Russia and what image he wanted to cultivate for his country in the new millennium. After V. Putin became acting president, he gave assurances that Russian foreign policy would not change. A debate on Russia’s foreign policy course, however, soon began, encompassing such traditional themes as whether Russia should be oriented toward the West or the East, should embrace “globalism” that includes ties with the West or “multipolarity” that emphasises equality in foreign relations and reliance on multi-lateral institutions. Though V. Putin, in his election campaign, mainly stressed domestic issues, he did appear to reject an anti-Western foreign policy. In a letter to the Russian people, V. Putin stated: “Russian foreign policy should promote national interests” (Light 2015: 17). The real, especially economic, interests of the country alone should determine what Russian diplomats do. This economic-centric approach became very pronounced in most of V. Putin’s subsequent policy decisions, particularly toward the countries of the near abroad.

10. Pragmatism: the cornerstone of V. Putin’s policy

V. Putin started readjusting Russian foreign policy even while he was the acting president. The aim was to protect Russian interests to the maximum extent, to make the nation strong, the people rich, and revive the economy. However, the cornerstone of the new Russian president was *pragmatism*. Such was the focus on pragmatism that V. Putin was prepared to give it another try with the West despite the recent bitterness in relations. He realised that Russia could not afford to break away from the financial aid for its economic recovery over at least the next decade. He was prepared to condone the West’s indifference, as shown in NATO’s actions, simply

because he was focused on Russia's economic interests. In an effort to convince the West, especially the United States, of his intentions, he urged the Duma to ratify START II as soon as possible. Russia also actively attempted to make friends with European countries (Mostafa, Mahmood, 2018). V. Putin invited German, British, French and Italian foreign ministers to visit Russia and held consultations on bilateral as well as global issues. On 16 April 2003, he broke convention and visited Britain on the eve of his presidential inauguration, conducting meetings with Prime Minister Tony Blair and business leaders. This not only demonstrated that V. Putin was prepared to adopt flexibility in Russian diplomacy but also made clear that V. Putin's pragmatism centred around economic interests. He was prepared to forget the recent wrongs if he thought that would help Russia attain economic prosperity and independence. This flexibility was most prominent in V. Putin's approach towards NATO. In a BBC interview, he indicated his desire for close ties with the West and more influence in NATO affairs, reflecting his decision to renew some Russian ties with NATO broken during the Kosovo conflict. He stated: "We believe we can talk about more profound integration with NATO, but only if Russia is regarded as an equal partner" (Aybet, Moore, 2010: 108). Russia had opposed the eastern expansion of NATO, V. Putin suggested, only because Moscow had been excluded from discussion of the issue, but this does not mean Russians are going to shut ourselves off from the world. Isolationism is not an option. When G. Robertson visited Russia in March 2000, V. Putin held talks with him and decided to make rapprochement with NATO and resume contacts. As the acting president, he even did not rule out "the possibility for Russia to join NATO" (Forsberg, Herd, 2015), if the latter paid attention to Russian interests and regarded Russia as an equal partner. The western response to V. Putin's gestures was immediate. The western creditors agreed to a package of postponements, reducing principal and interest rates, and an extension of the repayment period over 30 years.

There was a very discernable shift in Russia's foreign policy towards the West as soon as V. Putin was appointed as the acting president. Unsurprisingly, his pro-Western foreign policy became a source of much speculation, and even wonderment, among both Russian analysts and Russia-watchers in the West. According to one

school of thought, V. Putin has proven almost visionary in rejecting the reflexive anti-Americanism of his country's political class and steering foreign policy unequivocally westward. For some of the adherents of this view, V. Putin's move in this direction has been heroic, given that it has powerful opponents throughout Russia's foreign policy, military and security establishments, not to mention its parliament. The other, more cynical view of V. Putin's foreign policy shift proclaimed that it was aimed at winning the West's acquiescence to the suppression of press freedom, vote-rigging and human rights violations in Russia. The adherents of this school even suggested that Kremlin propagandists were deliberately fanning nationalistic opposition to V. Putin's foreign policy in order to convince the West that he is surrounded by "nationalistic and anti-Western wolves" (Dąbrowski 2021), and thus deserves increased support. Such cynicism, however, has not found much support from others.

In July 2000, V. Putin approved a new foreign policy doctrine focusing on economic interests, the rights of Russians abroad and intelligence gathering. V. Putin also endorsed a document already adopted by the Russian Security Council on the 24 March 2000, before his election in May. According to various news agencies reporting on the V. Putin doctrine, the top priority for the foreign ministry would be to defend Russian economic interests abroad (Abushov 2009). The document also focused on the situation of Russians living in the 14 other former Soviet constituent republics. Of particular concern was the alleged discriminatory treatment of Russian minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. What, however, seemed to grab everyone's attention was the element of pragmatism in the new doctrine. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was quoted as saying: "The special thing about this new conception is that it is more realistic than the one approved in 1993" (Abushov 2009: 53). The new foreign policy doctrine was linked to a new Russian security doctrine adopted by the Kremlin earlier that year, under which Russia hardened its line on the use of its nuclear arsenal. The new defence policy went further than the previous one drafted in 1997, which reserved for Russia the right to carry out a first nuclear strike in response to an armed aggression that seems to threaten the very existence of the Russian Federation (Fink, Olikier 2020). The new version said that Russia envisaged the possibility of using all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, where all other

means to settle the crisis have been exhausted or have proved ineffective. Observers have said that this reliance on nuclear weapons as a means to secure Russia indirectly hints at Russia's incapability to deal with threats through conventional means.

One of the problems that V. Putin faced on becoming the president of Russia was the creation of a free economic zone among the CIS members – something that had proved to be elusive for almost a decade. After Russia's August 1998 economic crisis, certain CIS countries began a customs war among themselves. Though many of these measures were later rescinded, as a rule, whenever Russian products were competitive they faced custom duties, while the CIS member states appealed to Moscow to continue the supply of cheap fuel. When Russia obliged, it soon discovered that even subsidised fuel was often not repaid; the CIS member states were much more concerned with settling their international debts to Western financial institutions and governments than with eliminating their debts to Moscow. V. Putin was infuriated by the fact that some CIS members, while maintaining the guise of the CIS, were indulging in other strategic games, which were not to Russia's advantage. A CIS Central Asian Union, composed of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, was created to stand up to Russia's military interventions in the region, while milking the Kremlin for maximum financial assistance. Much more significantly was the creation of the GUUAM, which consists of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (Tarr 2016). These countries were planning to establish their own free trade zone without consideration of Russia's interests. V. Putin reacted in the manner that has become his distinct style now. Moscow cancelled its visa-free travel regime with all these states. There were indications that V. Putin might take the drastic action of dismantling the CIS altogether and replace it with the individual bullying of key former Soviet republics. The instruments are Russia's traditional ones: oil deliveries and armed forces. V. Putin is determined to change Russia's policies towards the near abroad despite resistance from a number of states. No more slogans, or paper institutions within the CIS, but naked power and bullying is now Moscow's message. From another angle, V. Putin is employing a "carrot and stick" policy toward the near abroad. His new approach is exemplified in the case of Ukraine. He showed great respect for Ukraine by visiting Kiev first as the Russian

president. However, at the same time, he told the Ukrainians if they cannot settle their fuel bills, Russia would accept payment in the form of a share in Ukraine's oil pipelines. The goal is clear: if Russia ends up legally controlling the pipelines, Ukraine will lose some of its independence.

11. V. Putin and Ukraine

Ukraine is probably the best example of the new pragmatism in Russian policy toward the near abroad under Vladimir Putin. When V. Putin became the president of Russia, Russian-Ukrainian economic relations were in decline due to protectionism on both sides. However, Russia remains Ukraine's largest economic donor both in terms of state debt and energy. The energy debt of Ukraine has reached an astonishing 3.5 bln USD (Tarr 2016). Exploiting its near monopoly on Russian gas transit, Ukraine has delayed on repayments apart from the siphoning of 2 to 3 bln m³ of gas. There were several proposals for debt repayment that were never executed. On the other hand, given the state of its own economy, Russia could no longer afford to subsidise Ukraine. Recognizing the need to put pressure on Ukraine, V. Putin adopted a "no more free lunches" policy rather than his former brotherly attitudes towards Ukraine. Measures were taken to dismantle the donor-recipient model of economic relations between Russia and Ukraine, primarily by decreasing Russian dependence on Ukrainian transit. Alternative gas transit routes - e.g. through Belarus and Poland - were planned and executed.

Russian electricity supplies and deliveries of fuel for nuclear power stations were stopped or suspended by Russian producers who did not receive payments. In early December 1999, Russia imposed on Ukraine an oil and electricity embargo in order to persuade it not to steal gas from the pipelines. Also, during debt negotiations, Russia consistently tried to pursue an agenda that seemed to be coordinated with business. This contrasted with the earlier tradition in which all talks ended with Ukraine's promises to pay later and Russia's readiness to accept payments of (almost any) kind. In other words, ever since V. Putin's coming to power, Russian policy towards Ukraine has been more economically driven and aimed at promoting Russian business interests in Ukraine. It was clear that V. Putin was stepping up pressure on

Ukraine. Russia pressured L. Kuchma to fire Ukraine's pro-Western Foreign Minister, B. Tarasyuk, in 2000, and Prime Minister V. Yushchenko in 2001. In January 2001, Moscow and Kiev reportedly signed a 52-clause classified military agreement, giving Russia considerable influence over Ukrainian military planning (Szénási 2016). Clearly, Ukraine is under pressure to re-align itself more closely with Russia. This may be subtly aimed at alienating Ukraine from NATO. On the economic front, Russian companies are on a buying spree to gain control over the electric grids, oil and gas pipelines, and aluminium refineries, which will economically further link Ukraine to Russia. Russian companies are spending hundreds of billions of US dollars to acquire these assets. As it was predicted, Kiev turned towards Moscow by signing major intergovernmental agreements in June 2001, including gas transit agreements for 15 years, cooperation in the military-scientific sphere, steel, shipbuilding and many other fields of interstate cooperation (Szénási 2016).

Throughout V. Putin's presidency, Moscow has maintained a strategy toward Ukraine based on the notion that both countries' national identities are artificial. In a form of what T. Snyder refers to as the "politics of eternity" (Merutiu 2021), V. Putin frequently invokes the ideas of thinkers stressing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its peoples – particularly its Slavic, Orthodox core – in a form of what he calls the "politics of eternity", the belief in an unchanging historical essence.

V. Putin's address on the 21 February 2022 was particularly venomous. V. Putin has long asserted that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people" and that their shared past means that they should share a single political fate now. During a meeting with then-US President G. Bush in 2008, V. Putin allegedly said that "Ukraine is not even a country" (Merry 2015: 53). In his March 2014 speech to the Russian parliament announcing the annexation of Crimea, he also referred to Russians and Ukrainians as "one people" and he has returned to the theme in subsequent years, most notably in a six-thousand-word article titled "On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians" published in July 2021 (Sauvageot 2020: 145). V. Putin also stated in his pre-invasion speech that the current Ukrainian state was a creation of the Soviet Union and that it should be renamed after its putative "creator and architect," Bolshevik leader V. Lenin.

The last three decades, particularly after the 2014 “Revolution of Dignity” and the accompanying Russian annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas, have seen a substantial consolidation of Ukrainian civic identity. This Ukrainian civic nation includes not just Ukrainian speakers in the west but also much of the Russian-speaking but increasingly bilingual east. A generation has grown up in an independent Ukraine that, for all its shortcomings, has retained a solid democracy and is becoming more European in its view (due, in part, to Russia’s active intervention), even as V. Putin’s Russia remains obsessed with quasi-imperial great-power dreams. The current conflict has strengthened the bonds between Ukrainians from different regions, languages and religions. It has also made the divide between Ukrainian and Russian identities even stronger.

12. Conclusion

For the majority of the 1990s, Russia’s foreign policy toward the near abroad was in flux. Ever since 1991, Russian foreign policy has been concerned with the challenges posed by Iran, Turkey, as well as Belarus and Ukraine in the near abroad (Gjorshoski 2020). Though this threat did not take on dangerous dimensions during the last decade, Russia cannot remain complacent about these challenges. Russia continues to be very concerned about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey to Central Asia and also, possibly, to the Muslim populations inside the Russian Federation (Modebadze 2020). This concern, together with the absence of clear border demarcations within Central Asia, was cited as one reason that Russia remains intent on defending the outermost border of Central Asia, an objective that has been used to justify the continued presence of Russian guards on Tajik borders and now in Ukraine.

The establishment of equal relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics is greatly hindered by the Russian desire to continue to see these countries as exclusively within the Russian sphere of influence and geopolitical interests. On many occasions, Russia has not hesitated to use military force to protect the Russian-speaking populations in the countries of the near abroad, just like in the recent invasion of Ukraine. In fact, the military doctrine approved by the Russian Federation Se-

curity Council in 1993 specifically mentioned this right to defend Russian minorities. This doctrine has been executed by Russia on several occasions, as seen in the cases of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The Near Abroad states have criticised Russia for interfering in their internal affairs.

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wpłynęło/received 07.05.2022; poprawiono/revised 11.06.2022

Public activism of the war period: structure, forms and possibilities

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Abstract

The aim of the study is to conceptualise the wartime activism and to determine its place in the system of public activism. Wartime activism is analysed on the example of Russia's open armed aggression against Ukraine in 2022. The investigation is based on event-analysis, as well as field research that was conducted under wartime conditions. From the perspective of the theory and tradition of public activism, the expediency of distinguishing in the public activism system of such a type as wartime activism is argued. Its specific tasks, mechanisms of their implementation, risks, etc. are identified. Wartime activism is defined as a network of citizens' initiatives, their interactions (ones with military units, governmental and non-governmental institutions, interpersonal interactions, etc.) to counter the aggressor, save the lives and health of citizens, infrastructure, etc. This type of activism is positioned as the one that arises solely as a response of the democratic community to armed aggression and is realised in wartime. All the characteristics of wartime activism are presented as those caused by the peculiarities of wartime. It is emphasised that wartime activism: (1) is territorially limited to the borders of the state against which armed aggression was committed, and outside these borders acquires the format of anti-war activism; (2) is implemented in both real and virtual dimensions; (3) has the potential to unite the democratic community on a global scale. The structural model of wartime public activism is presented as a combination of three subsystems: frontline, rear area and foreign, each subsystem combining public activism in online and offline formats.

Keywords: public activism, wartime activism, war, Ukraine, Russian aggression.

1. Introduction

The war is by no means a social performance, but a tangle of lost lives, injuries, broken families, destroyed infrastructure, loss of everything earned, collapse of dreams, plans, physical and mental health. Ukraine and its peaceful citizens from 24 February 2022 were involuntarily drawn into the orbit of war. These events managed to stir up the whole world – both democratic and new authoritarian, demonstrating the true standards of each actor in the world politics.

The response to war is primarily the actions of the state, but reinforced by civil society and personal courage of many citizens. These responses may be different: someone defends a country with lethal weapons, someone is a volunteer in the rear, someone is a hacktivist fighter on the cyber front, someone with a word, a brush or graffiti visualises the problem.

Despite all the horrors of the war, the incredible courage of the Ukrainian military, the present paper focuses on the indomitable spirit of the Ukrainians and their creativity in the struggle for their independence and European values. The Ukrainians already demonstrated their ingenuity, creative spirit and thirst for life during the Revolution on Granite (1990), the Orange Revolution (2004-2005) and, especially, the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014). Then the photos and videos of musical improvisations on the yellow and blue piano (performance), the collective singing of the national anthem by about 500,000 people on New Year's Eve 2014 (happening), the construction of the main Christmas tree of Ukraine, which became evidence of the resistance of the Ukrainians (political art-installation), etc. went round the world. Much was written about the creative forms of protest of the Ukrainians at that time (Khoma 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Kozak 2017; Khoma, Kozma, 2022).

In fact, before the war of 2022, the actionist format of the protest fitted very well into the strategy of soft power, non-violent resistance, it also created an information pretext, launched an extensive discussion of the problem. This formed the image of a peaceful Ukraine in the international arena, when only the need to respond to aggression forces the Ukrainians to take up arms. Russia's violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine in February 2022 led not only to full mobilisation at the state level, but also to maximum consolidation at the societal lev-

el, and the emergence of diverse new forms of social interaction. These processes need to be studied in order to understand the nature, features and opportunities of public activism in the situations of war.

The aim of the study is to conceptualise wartime activism and determine its place in the system of public activism. This aim is achieved by analysing wartime activism on the example of Russia's war against Ukraine in 2022.

The issue of wartime activism in the system of public activism was hardly considered in social sciences. There is an explanation for this. Firstly, in modern democratic states, armed clashes have not yet occurred on such a scale as Russia's 2022 war against Ukraine. Therefore, there was no empirical material that would be the basis for the study of public activism at the time of open armed confrontation in a democratic state. Secondly, today internet communication is so highly advanced that, even during the war, countless public initiatives and mutual assistance based on trust become possible. Thirdly, over the three decades of independence, a democratic civil society has been formed in Ukraine, stable horizontal networks created, a rather considerable social capital accumulated, the majority of the public is committed to models of democratic political culture, there is a clear orientation towards European values and the networks of horizontal ties and the ability to quickly create new communication networks, channels, etc. are developed. They became the driving force of Ukrainians' resistance to the Russian aggressor. These factors make the Ukrainian case unique for the study of wartime activism.

2. Methodology

The present research is based on the theory and tradition of public activism. They conceptualise different types of activism – from the classic ones, which have a long history, to the latest, e.g. activism in social media (Baldwin 2018), cyber activism (Sandoval-Almazan, Gil-Garcia, 2014), hacktivism (Richards, Wood, 2018), etc. The study involves the methodological approaches of social movement theory, the collective action theory (Simon 1957; Olson 1965; Axelrod 1984, 1997; Macy 1991; Ostrom 1998, 2000; Reuben 2003; Czech 2016). The current integration of online and offline activism is taken into consideration (Greijdanus et al., 2020).

P. Oliver and G. Marwell (1992: 251) define social activists as “people who care enough about some issue that they are prepared to incur significant costs and act to achieve their goals”. “Most of the authors are referring to social participation, mobilisation, social movements when they are speaking about social activism” (Dumitraşcu 2015: 86). This article considers public activism as a system of actions (both organised and spontaneous) that are aimed at achieving a certain socially significant result, social change through collective efforts.

In today’s world, public activism has a broad focus – the environment, anti-corruption, sports, human rights, assistance to refugees, etc. The range of directions of public activism and its scale depend on the level of democracy of a state, dominant values in a given society and samples of political culture. The activism that manifests itself under open armed aggression can be positioned as a separate element of the system of public activism – wartime activism – in view of its special tasks, implementation mechanisms, risks, etc.

The study is based primarily on event-analysis, which collected and analysed a large amount of data on public activism in the first weeks of Ukrainian resistance to the Russian aggressor. As the author was a direct eyewitness of and participant in the events related to Russia’s military aggression, she conducted a participant observation of the actions of public activists and interacted with them in various formats. Within the framework of such field research, the peculiarities of public activism in wartime conditions were clarified and the key directions of activity within this type of activism were identified. Also, in order to assess public activism in wartime, the content of numerous groups on social networks and messengers was monitored and critically evaluated.

3. Wartime public activism: content and structure

It is obvious that the structure and characteristics of public activism under violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity by the aggressor state differ significantly from the activism during the most acute moments of the Ukrainian history – the Revolution of Dignity, annexation of Crimea and the proclamation of unrecognised republics in Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. The peculiarity of this

activism is primarily in the increase of risks to life, health, etc. associated with certain actions. Most of these public actions occur next to the enemy rather than in the quiet rear.

On the one hand, in the structure of public activism there are large-scale volunteer initiatives that have legal registration, powerful information support, numerous human resources, certain reputation capital, etc. On the other hand, public activism during the war includes millions of actions and interactions of citizens that operate outside organised communities, being spontaneous and situational initiatives of the people. In other words, one can distinguish between public activism which is organised, structured and large-scale, with certain history of functioning, on the one hand, and public activism which is spontaneous and situational, on the other. In both types of wartime public activism, patriotic, humanistic motives are obvious. They are the ones that activate citizens in choosing a model of behaviour that involves unpaid activities for a certain socially important result. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the war also provokes various formats of dishonest, criminal behaviour. This applies to various frauds under the guise of supposedly public initiatives. They are usually related to raising funds for the needs of the army, victims, etc.

The case of Ukraine in 2022 is likely to become the basis for expanding the theory of public activism, in view of the emergence of numerous new formats of action. Many of them would be unacceptable in peacetime. However, external aggression requires new formats of activism – often spontaneous, sometimes radical, self-organised, with risks to life and health. In fact, the present analysis not only indicates the possibilities of a well-organised volunteer movement, but also draws attention to the grassroots level of public initiatives.

Wartime activism is an extremely dynamic, rapidly changing network of various public initiatives, interactions between citizens, as well as with military units, governmental and non-governmental institutions, other actors for the purpose of countering the aggressor, saving lives and health, infrastructure, etc. Wartime activism can be positioned as an element of the system of public activism that emerges in response to armed aggression.

All the characteristics of this type of activism are conditioned by the peculiarities and needs of wartime. Due to the nature of the events that give rise to this type of activism, it occurs very rapidly and has a certain length of time (period of wartime declared by the authorities), must take into account various restrictions (e.g. curfew and mine risk). This distinguishes it from other types of activism, which are usually focused on a long-term format in peacetime. Wartime activism is limited to the territory in which martial law is imposed, and outside it acquires the format of anti-war activism.

Wartime activism combines various formats of online and offline activism. The structural model of wartime public activism is a synthesis of three subsystems: frontline, rear area and foreign. Each subsystem combines public activism in online and offline formats. A feature of wartime activism is its prospect of reformatting into post-war activism aimed at post-war reconstruction of the country and other tasks.

From the beginning of Russia's armed aggression, the Ukrainian public was most actively involved in the following forms of public activism: volunteering in support of the army; financial assistance, especially to the army; health care facilities; countering the misinformation; assistance to internally displaced persons (housing, clothing, basic necessities, medicines, transportation, etc.). This is only the upper level in the system of public activism in wartime.

Frontline activism involves a variety of actions of the residents, business, non-governmental organisations, the church and other actors for the purposes of national resistance in the area where hostilities occur. They can be grouped by areas: (1) various forms of support by the civilians of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; (2) the entry of civilians into the Territorial Defence Forces, volunteer units; (3) the opposition to the enemy (disinformation, destruction or seizure of weapons, blocking of roads for the passage of equipment, organising mass peaceful protests against the occupiers, etc.); (4) the assistance in the evacuation of civilians through open humanitarian corridors; (5) the delivery of humanitarian goods and transportation of the wounded; (6) the search for missing or lost children and adults with whom contact is lost and single elderly people; (7) the rescue of stray animals, etc. This activism is dangerous to life and health due to the terrorist behaviour of the Russian army, mined roads and

buildings, as well as abductions, arrests, torture and executions of both Ukrainians and foreigners. It is necessary to notice that when all initiatives of various state and non-state actors did not work, the representatives of the clergy of different denominations undertook to perform certain tasks. A vivid example was besieged Mariupol, where for many days they tried to deliver humanitarian cargo with the involvement of priests.

Internet communication channels play an important role in the implementation of some public initiatives, through which, for example, it is possible to find vehicles for evacuation, help people with disabilities to leave the war zone, deliver food to those who cannot leave their homes for various reasons, release pets, help with medication, etc.

Rear area activism includes diverse actions of civil society actors, which can be grouped into the following areas: (1) logistical support for the army, volunteer battalions (food, medicine, helmets, bullet-proof vests, optoelectronic devices, military clothing, etc.); (2) humanitarian, informational and other support for internally displaced persons; (3) work on the information front: countering misinformation, sending complaints with demands to block the groups on social networks and messengers with destructive content, etc.; (4) transportation of humanitarian goods from abroad and their transfer to the destination; (5) assistance in the evacuation of civilians from the war zone, accommodation of internally displaced persons; (6) coordination of flows of internally displaced persons to different border crossings depending on their current congestion; (7) signing petitions, open letters and other formats of communication activism; (8) medical and psychological counselling, psychological assistance to those who remain in the war zone (by means of online communication), internally displaced persons; (9) assistance while waiting at checkpoints on the western border of Ukraine (deployment of warming centres, food services areas, etc.); (10) rescue of abandoned pets. This list of civic initiatives is not exhaustive, as it includes many different actions initiated by civil society actors.

Notably, within the rear area direction of activism, local business appeared to be clearly socially responsible. The first weeks of the war demonstrated that Ukrainian business finally moved away from the paradigm of economic rationality (the de-

sire to obtain the greatest economic result with minimal expenditure of necessary resources) to corporate social responsibility.

The full coordination of the actions of Ukrainian civil society with the institutions of the state during the war must be emphasised. As soon as civil society signalled a problem with the implementation of the tasks undertaken, state institutions responded immediately. For example, the simplification of the rules for the import of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, the elimination of checkpoints that significantly complicated the transportation of humanitarian goods, the introduction of a simplified procedure for customs clearance of goods in wartime, etc. Conversely, when state institutions asked for help on a particular issue, activists responded promptly.

Foreign activism includes a wide range of actions of Ukrainian civil society, which are aimed at interaction with the public from abroad, representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. These interactions concerned: (1) a request to form an impartial opinion about Russian aggression in Ukraine, to disseminate information about the actions of the Russian army; (2) ensuring the humanitarian needs of the Ukrainian army and internally displaced persons, transferring humanitarian aid from abroad to Ukraine; (3) attracting broad public diplomacy opportunities to put pressure on the governments of democratic states to increase their support for Ukraine, pressure on international corporations to exit the Russian market; (4) translations in foreign languages information about events in Ukraine for the dissemination of credible information on social media and by means of other channels; (5) accommodation of those citizens of Ukraine who applied for temporary protection and/or assistance in their employment. These are only a few areas of wartime public activism in the segment of international cooperation.

4. The main directions of organised wartime public activism

Several areas of organised public activity of the Ukrainian community during the war can be distinguished. Importantly, the formats of wartime public activism to be named later are only part of a wide spectrum of actions and initiatives. With each day of the war, the range of areas of public activism increased, and the tasks changed, according to the needs of the moment. That is, public activism during the

war is characterised by rapid dynamics, i.e. quick responses to new challenges caused by external aggression.

The first group of actions concerns numerous initiatives of volunteer organisations. Public structures that support the army and internally displaced persons have been operating in Ukraine for almost a decade. Therefore, the experience of organising such assistance by Ukrainian volunteers is considerable. Volunteer initiatives caused by the war can be grouped according to the needs: food, military needs, medical care, clothing, freight and passenger transportation, translators, psychological assistance, etc. During the war, various platforms were created (e.g., <https://v-tylu.work/>, <https://volonter.org/>, <https://t.me/people4ua>, etc.), on which everyone could offer themselves as a volunteer in a certain direction or ask for help about something. Volunteer organisations declared a narrow focus (assistance to people with disabilities, internally displaced persons, abandoned animals, etc.), specific areas of activity (transportation of humanitarian aid or people from the war zone, cooking for the front or internally displaced persons, search for missing people, etc.). Undoubtedly, the volunteer movement is the most organised, effective segment of public activism in wartime and Russia's military aggression has resulted in the creation of the largest international volunteer network in modern history.

The second group of actions concerns cyber-activism or digital activism. The role of activists in this field is extremely important, as the current wars are waged not only in geographical spaces, but also in cyberspace. The key role here is played by IT specialists and companies. They help repel DDoS attacks on the banking sector, official websites of the Ukrainian authorities, etc., and organise cyber attacks on the infrastructure of the public sector of the Russian Federation. However, even the skills of the average user are enough for digital activism, e.g. blocking pages on social networks with anti-Ukrainian content, preventing the spread of fakes, and so on. Thanks to social networks and messengers, the whole IT army of Ukraine was created, which performs many tasks: development of special software, creation of specialised chatbots, etc. These processes received state support, including the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine.

The third group of actions concerns the fighters of the information front. The main, but not the only, platforms for information activism are social networks. Nowadays, bloggers, influencers, especially those with multi-million audiences, are really able to shape public opinion. The fighters of the information front face many tasks: copywriting, social media marketing (SMM), fact checking, sharing, gathering information, blocking propaganda resources, etc.

An important area of activity for information front activists is the preparation of high-quality English-language content to inform citizens of other countries about the situation in Ukraine. Examples are We Are Ukraine (<https://www.weareukraine.info/>), Post to Stop War in Ukraine (<https://post-to-stop-war.in.ua/>) and others. The need for such public initiatives is due to the fact that Ukraine does not have a strong system of broadcasting to foreign audiences in foreign languages. Such channels of communication are aimed at voicing Ukraine's messages, spreading appeals to the public of other countries to increase pressure on their governments to support Ukraine, admit it to the EU, strengthen sanctions against Russia and the like. No less important, but very difficult to implement is the transmission of information to Russian audiences. This work is complicated by information aggression, including hate speech on the part of Russian users of social networks. This was especially noticeable in the first weeks of the war, when all popular social networks were available to users from Russia.

The fourth group of actions concerns the involvement of local inhabitants in the protection of public order in settlements and on roads. Initiated by the authorities or unauthorised, checkpoints were built by activists from all sorts of materials. The joint efforts of the police, territorial defence volunteers and the public were aimed at counteracting the passage of Russian military equipment and the penetration of sabotage groups. Numerous checkpoints were set up by the public. However, the activity of the Ukrainians in setting up unauthorised checkpoints a few days after the beginning of the war proved ineffective, as they hindered the movement of emergency services and humanitarian goods. Consequently, various volunteer community groups were involved in the arrangement of checkpoints together with district military administrations. For instance, in the first days of the Russian aggression, 544 checkpoints

were constructed in Lviv region, but in two weeks their number was reduced to 100. The rest of the checkpoints were turned into observation posts, supported by local communities.

At the urging of local authorities, residents were involved in round-the-clock patrols. All those who wished to patrol were registered with the nearest state administrations and included in patrol groups to assist the police and territorial defence forces. This experience is not new for the Ukrainians, as after the bloody events during the Revolution of Dignity (the night of 19 February 2014) there was a “Night of Wrath” (destruction of office buildings in Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, etc.). At that time, many volunteers participated in the processes of ensuring the security of cities and preventing looting. In 2022, the main focus of such patrols was on identifying saboteurs and eliminating the consequences of their sabotage.

Also, at the initiative of the State Agency of Automobile Roads of Ukraine, citizens and territorial communities engaged in the dismantling of road signs, plaques with the names of administrative premises or other objects, which indicated the name of the settlement. All signs were handed over to local authorities for safekeeping. That was done to disorient Russian troops, who had poor communications and difficulties in navigating the terrain. Instead, the local communities contributed to the placement of new signs aimed not at the regulation of traffic, but at the psychological impact on the Russian military: “The occupiers are not allowed to move”, “Surrender right now or meet death”, and others.

As can be seen, the Ukrainian public worked closely with state institutions to counter Russian aggression. The conditions of the war contributed to strong cooperation between the state and public sectors. If in peacetime, there are traditional debates between the state and civil society, large or small confrontations, then the war determined other algorithms of interaction.

The fifth group of actions is the classic formats of public activism (meeting, demonstration, picket, march, etc.). It should be noted that the legal regime of war-time prohibits such mass events. It is difficult to conduct them during the war due to the high risk to the life and health of the organisers and participants. However, even under the threat of physical destruction by the Russian military, Ukrainian citizens

staged pro-Ukrainian protests. Importantly, mass protests of civilians with Ukrainian symbols took place at the time when cities were under the control of Russian troops. A substantial number of such mass events occurred in the southern war-struck regions of Ukraine: Zaporizhzhia (Enerhodar, Melitopol, Tokmak, Berdiansk, etc.), Luhansk (Starobilsk), Donetsk (Kramatorsk, Mariupol), Kherson (Henichesk, Nova Kakhovka, Skadovsk, Kherson, etc.). In the course of many such peaceful actions, with the demand for the Russian troops to retreat, the Russian military used weapons, with human casualties. In particular, in Nova Kakhovka, Melitopol, Chaplynka and other settlements of Ukraine, the Russian military opened fire on peaceful protesters. It is indicative that peaceful protests in captured cities in southern Ukraine were not ceased even after the beginning of arrests, threats of execution for participating in peaceful protests under Ukrainian flags, as well as the abduction of government officials, local governments, protest coordinators, local activists, human rights activists and priests.

Moreover, the people of many Ukrainian settlements came out in an organised manner to meet Russian equipment with demands not to let it in. In some places it was effective. Examples were recorded of how Russian troops retreated under pressure from unarmed citizens who did not allow them to enter their settlement.

The same forms of peaceful protest positioned as actionism (e.g. performances, happenings, art installations, flash mobs, etc.) are actively conducted against the background of Russia's aggression, but outside Ukraine. In most democratic countries, diverse forms of protests in support of Ukraine took place. Requirements varied depending on the situation. In the early days of the war, peaceful protesters appealed to governments to provide military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, block Russia's access to SWIFT, tighten sanctions against individual citizens of the Russian Federation, and the like. Most of the messages concerned the request to "close the sky", i.e. to cover Ukraine with NATO's Integrated Air Defence System. Many anti-war protests outside Ukraine were organised thanks to the Ukrainian diaspora around the world. Only in Russia and Belarus the participants of such actions were brought to justice.

The sixth group of actions concerns public initiatives aimed at saving the lives and health of the military and civilians during the war. First of all, blood donation should be emphasised here. In addition, by efforts of medical facilities, medical educational institutions many trainings were organised on the provision of medical care, and here activism from two sides can be observed: some wanted to teach, and others wanted to learn. This refers to numerous initiatives related to the collection and targeted transfer of medicines for the needs of the military and civilians, the evacuation of seriously ill patients outside Ukraine. One cannot fail to mention the provision by many private medical institutions of free services, including doctors' online consultations. In the war zone, even complex operations were carried out with the remote involvement of specialists via video communication, and babies were also delivered.

The seventh group of actions concerns the sphere of culture and spiritual life. For instance, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine involved the general public in gathering information about the damage caused by Russian aggressors to cultural heritage sites in Ukraine. Thanks to concerned citizens, the facts of destruction of archaeological sites, ancient buildings, historical cemeteries, monuments, religious buildings, works of art, natural monuments, buildings of cultural institutions, etc. were recorded. Owing to the public, cases of robbery of museums, libraries, etc. by the Russian military were systematised. Verified information is due to be passed to the International Criminal Court in the Hague for investigation.

One of the brightest cases was the rescue of works by the world-famous Ukrainian artist M. Prymachenko with the help of the public. During the offensive, the Russian army burned down the local history museum in the village of Ivankiv, Kyiv region, where some of the artist's works were held. It was the local community that managed to save a large number of museum exhibits.

Also in the ancient cities of Ukraine, some of which are UNESCO World Heritage Sites, as well as in the places where in museum funds valuable exhibits are stored, the public, authorities and local businesses made great efforts to prevent their destruction during possible bombardments. For example, in Lviv, open-air objects were wrapped in fireproof and protective materials. Stained glass windows were closed with protective screens. Unique sculptures, in particular of a sacred nature,

were dismantled and moved to the dungeons. Such delicate work with UNESCO World Heritage Sites is conducted not by the public but by restoration professionals, but during the war human, financial, technical and other resources were accumulated for this at the level of society and non-governmental organisations (e.g. the Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments).

An important part of public activism was the gatherings of representatives of culture and spiritual life around common problems that were not only acute during the war, but are likely to be relevant for a long time after the end of Russian aggression. As an illustration, on the initiative of the Municipal Museum in Lviv “Territory of Terror”, the Museum Crisis Fund “Emergency Museum Aid” was organised. Its task was to provide financial support to museums, especially in small towns and villages in eastern and southern Ukraine, which were at the epicentre of Russian aggression. During the acute phase of the war, the assistance was related to meeting the basic needs (food, medicine) of the workers of these museums, who survived and preserved the local heritage. Further support formats are aimed at post-war reconstruction.

The eighth group of actions concerns the field of science and education. In the first days of the war, Ukrainian scientists turned to Clarivate and Elsevier, which own the abstract, bibliographic databases Scopus and Web of Science, to suspend cooperating with Russia, deprive Russian institutions of access to these databases, and cease indexing Russian publications. The Ukrainian scientific and pedagogical community was actively involved in lobbying to limit Russia’s participation in all EU instruments for scientific and innovation cooperation.

Ukrainian researchers appealed to foreign institutions and research foundations to reconsider their policy of cooperation in education and science with Russia and those countries that supported the armed aggression against Ukraine. Ukrainian educational institutions and research institutes also signed letters to Russian scientists and educators, but the response was reduced to the Address of the Russian Union of Rectors with full support for any of V. Putin’s actions.

Ukrainian scientists united around the idea of limiting Russia’s participation in all EU instruments for scientific and innovation cooperation (Horizon Europe, In-

terreg Europe, Eureka, etc.). The community of Ukrainian scientists also initiated the issue of excluding the Russian Federation from a number of international organisations (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission UNESCO, Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, International Centre for Black Sea Studies, etc.). Additionally, the Ukrainian scientific and pedagogical community actively lobbied for a boycott of international scientific events in the Russian Federation, suspending the participation of Russian scientists, students and educational institutions in international academic mobility programmes. Generally, the scientific and pedagogical community during the war was strongly united and clearly articulated their demands and requests.

Besides, the Ukrainian pedagogical community actively supported internally displaced persons and collected aid for the army. From the first day of the war, various educational centres, headquarters, centres for the collection of humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons, the army, etc. began to operate in many educational institutions. Separate buildings of educational institutions and gyms received internally displaced persons.

It must be noted that within the framework of this article it is hardly possible to present the whole spectrum of areas of public activity, only those that were most clearly manifested in the first weeks of Russia's military aggression in Ukraine are therefore indicated.

5. The main directions of spontaneous wartime public activism

Public activism of the Ukrainians during the war was not only organised but also spontaneous. Its implementation was dictated by the situation, i.e. the requirement of a specific time in a specific place. Several types of spontaneous activism can be singled out.

The *first group* of actions concerns the seizure of Russian military equipment by unarmed civilians at risk to their lives and the capture of the soldiers of the occupying army. Some of the plots seem surreal. Here are several examples of the first days of the war:

- in Kyiv, two ordinary “guys from Obolon” seized an armoured personnel carrier that stopped, pulled out the Russian servicemen, waited for the representatives of the Ukrainian armed forces and handed over the invaders to them;

- at the Sumy-Tovarna railway station, two workers misinformed the Russian servicemen and diverted their armoured personnel carrier to a dead-end siding; this became a trap for the occupiers;

- in the village of Liubymivka, Kherson region, a coalition of Roma and local peasants dismantled the tank to an inoperative condition, and then the Roma stole an infantry fighting vehicle with the help of an ordinary tractor;

- in the village of Stanova, Sumy region, while the Russian servicemen were robbing a local grocery store, peasants stole their fuel truck.

These are only some examples of the desperate local resistance of the unarmed Ukrainians who accumulated all their ingenuity to defend their land. Such actions increase the technical and human losses which were inflicted by the Ukrainian army. The activism, which in peacetime would be seen as a crime, finds tremendous public support in wartime (especially through social media) and gratitude at various levels.

The *second group* of actions concerns the public response to cases of looting. The instant reaction was the punishment of those who in wartime impinged on the property of the wounded, the killed, the premises that were destroyed or unguarded. During the war, eyewitnesses became investigators, judges and executors of the people’s verdict. Surely, in Ukraine there are criminal procedural mechanisms for punishing looters; they were even strengthened after the beginning of the war (3 to 10 years in prison), but the recording of such cases, most often in wartime, immediately escalated into a vigilantism that received the approval of both the people and the informal approval of the authorities.

Actually, from the first days of the war, the popular flash mob “Catch and Punish the Marauder” began to spread in Ukraine, because such express cases of vigilantism were recorded in many cities. The most popular form of punishment for looters during the Russian aggression of 2022 was to attach the trapped to the nearest pole. Such first best poles served as the medieval pillory for the public disgrace of the criminal. To enhance the social and educational effect (so to speak, preventive

measures), the marauder was stripped of his clothes, strapped, and so on. The punishment itself presupposed, first of all, public shame and disgrace.

The *third group* of actions concerns the capture or physical elimination of the Russian military. Here are the active civilians who, taking into account the scope of their professional activities or hobbies, own weapons. Examples are Ukrainian game wardens and hunters. From the first days of the war, with the support of the authorities and territorial defence force, game wardens, foresters, and hunters actually arranged “safaris” for the Russian military. These people are valuable for their knowledge of all the paths and ravines in a particular area where the enemy may hide. It is noteworthy that these groups of Ukrainian citizens were activated by the state, in particular by the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, O. Reznikov.

The *fourth group* of public actions concerns the production of self-made means of defence. First of all, it is referred to bottles with incendiary mixture for further disposal of Russian equipment. To make them, from the first minutes of the war the collection of glassware began. Homeless people were among the first to join, taking glassware out of garbage containers. Civilised collection of glass bottles, as well as fabrics, fuels and other components for the preparation of explosive mixtures was arranged very quickly. Notably, state institutions (e.g. the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine) through social networks and messengers actively instructed how to make flammable mixtures. In peacetime, something like this would seem a fantasy.

As Russian aggression grew, the ingenuity and creative energy of the Ukrainians had only an upward trend. As an illustration, instead of manually throwing Molotov cocktails, folk inventors proposed the design of a catapult that can throw inflamed bottles over a much greater distance. This is how the inventions of the ancient Greeks came in handy during the high-tech wars of the 21st century.

The public also constructed barricades from car tires to set them on fire as enemy approached, making it difficult for enemy vehicles to move. Many citizens, including business representatives joined in the collection of metal and the manufacture of various non-explosive barriers, especially anti-tank “hedgehogs” and “stars”. Such metal structures are meant to stop or at least slow down the enemy’s heavy military equipment. Students and teachers of vocational schools, as well as private en-

trepreneurs who made metal products before the war were involved in their manufacture. For most, it was a whole new social experience. The production of camouflage nets, which all age groups joined, also became widespread.

The fifth group of actions concerns the sphere of religious life, the interaction of religious organisations and believers in counteracting Russian aggression. First of all, it should be noted that in Ukraine, from the first days of the war, the Russian army had been shelling sacred buildings of all denominations. Many ancient and modern religious buildings were destroyed. In the event of the destruction of the buildings of religious organisations, first of all the clergy and the parishioners defended the objects of church use, preventing looting in damaged temples.

Since the days of the Revolution of Dignity, many religious communities actively engaged in the aid collection and numerous actions to support the Ukrainian statehood. Hence, during the war of 2022, they had networks of social contacts for cooperation in various areas: medical care and temporary shelter, front assistance, cooking, and so on. During the war, many sacred buildings became shelters from shelling and bombing. They turned into centres for the collection and distribution of things to internally displaced persons. The initiatives of religious organisations to help internally displaced persons during the evacuation, or while waiting to cross the state border are important. Religious communities organised meals for internally displaced persons, collected and redistributed basic necessities. The spectrum of activity of religious communities is presently very extensive. It is worth mentioning that the church has a long tradition to be an important link in social initiatives, especially in times of crisis (philosophy of social ministries).

The sixth group of actions concerns the support of pets, because not all owners, fleeing shelling, were able to take them out. A large number of domestic animals were found at train stations and along routes. Some of these animals were taken into the care of animal shelters. Such shelters arranged for the transfer of animals to new owners, and the community helped with food. In general, assistance to abandoned, lost pets became a separate area of social cohesion. Many online initiatives (Zoopatrul Kyiv, Save Pets of Ukraine, "Fauna Service", etc.), chat bots and groups on social networks were launched. In this way, information was collected, requests for

help from pet owners, breeders, zoo volunteers, citizens who found abandoned animals were processed.

A particular problem during the war was the zoos located in the war zone, both private and public. The role of caring citizens in supporting animals that were hostages of the war was great, at least with food and water. However, sincere intentions to help animals during the war also had tragic consequences, as in the Feldman Ecopark, Kharkiv region, where volunteers, who after appeals on social networks agreed to come to feed the animals, were shot dead. Still, in the intervals between shelling and bombing, citizens managed to take some of the animals out of various zoos and animal shelters.

Since zoos are not profitable in wartime, keeping animals became a real problem. The solution was to buy online tickets by caring citizens for conditional visits to the zoo. This special method of crowdfunding appeared to be a way to save animals. Such actions are also regarded as public activism.

The seventh group of actions concerns evacuation activism. It would be wrong to state that this is an exclusively spontaneous type of activism, as the state and volunteer organisations are actively involved in the evacuation. Concurrently, the evacuation process demonstrated a great unity of society in mutual assistance. First of all, social networks were used to search for those who could take an additional passenger. Through special services, some citizens could inform about a place in the car, while others could take advantage of such an offer. This is not about providing paid transport services, but about being willing to help fellow citizens. The evacuation direction was also realised through the assistance to reach the state border from relatively safe cities. Residents of Ukraine's border villages provided support to those who had been waiting for a long time to cross the border.

As in the case of the organised type of activism, only a small part of the areas of wartime public activism of the spontaneous type are indicated here. The cases mentioned give an idea of the architecture of wartime activism, they do not, however, exhaust its characteristic.

6. Conclusions

Wartime activism is a system of initiatives of citizens, their interactions (among themselves, with military units, governmental and non-governmental institutions and other entities) to counter the aggressor state, save the lives of citizens, preserve or restore infrastructure, etc. This type of activism is an element of the system of public activism that arises in response to armed aggression and is realised in wartime. All the characteristics of wartime activism are the result of a violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity of one country by another (aggressor), due to the realities of wartime. Wartime activism: (1) is not territorially limited by the borders of the state against which the armed aggression was carried out, but is spread outside in the format of anti-war activism; (2) is implemented in both real and virtual dimensions; (3) has the potential to unite the general public on an international scale.

The structural model of wartime public activism combines three subsystems: frontline, rear area and foreign. Each subsystem consists of public activism in online and offline formats and combines activism of the organised and spontaneous types. With the beginning of Russia's armed aggression, the Ukrainian public was most actively involved in the following forms of public activism: volunteering in support of the army; financial assistance, especially to the army, health care facilities; countering misinformation; assistance to internally displaced persons (accommodation, clothing, basic necessities, medicines, transportation and others), etc. This is only the upper level in the system of public activism in wartime.

The frontline subsystem of wartime activism includes numerous actions of the local citizens where hostilities take place, where mine laying is possible. Therefore, such activism is dangerous to the lives and health of activists. Activists assist government agencies in carrying out specific wartime tasks or undertake a particular segment of work: helping rescuers dismantle debris after bombings, transporting the wounded to hospitals, searching for the missing, assisting in the evacuation of civilians, helping with food, and the like.

The rear area subsystem of wartime activism includes a complex of diverse actions of the public. This activism poses less risk to the lives and health of activists than within the frontline subsystem. Activists complement the actions of state institu-

tions to provide logistical support to the army, hospitals, and internally displaced persons. They become “virtual fighters” of the information front, rescue animals, search for missing people, sign petitions, form public opinion, join the maintenance of law and order, etc.

The foreign subsystem of wartime activism provides for the interaction of the Ukrainian public with the public from abroad, representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. These interactions concern: the formation of an objective opinion about Russian aggression in Ukraine; humanitarian needs of the Ukrainian army and civilians; attracting ample opportunities for public diplomacy to put pressure on the governments of democracies to increase support for Ukraine, pressure on international corporations to exit the Russian market.

Given the volume of the article, the analysis was limited to relatively few areas of public activism of the organised and spontaneous types, which were recorded in the first weeks of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2022. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the system of wartime activism is much broader, which requires further study and conceptualisation. The Case of Ukraine in 2022 provides expansive empirical material for further conceptualisation of wartime public activism.

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wpłynęło/received 09.03.2022; poprawiono/revised 05.04.2022

Contingencies of self-worth in relation to a person's Facebook use

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Abstract

The connection between the personal importance of individually specific self-aspects (self-contingencies) and the intensity of social media use is well known (e.g. people who are overly concerned with their appearance often post many photos on social media). To explore this connection more deeply, the present study examined whether the connection between the personal importance of specific self-aspects and the intensity of social media use is influenced by the increasing popularity of social media, specifically Facebook. A comparison was performed between the use intensity and self-contingencies of two samples (831 vs 224 participants). The data showed correlations between every self-contingency and use intensity, demonstrating that social media use is interpretable with relation to the self. Some correlations remained the same across measures (e.g. the competition and appearance contingencies), but others showed a positive change, whether from negative to neutral (the family and virtue contingencies) or from neutral to positive (the academic competence and others' approval contingencies). Thus, increasing social media popularity is mirrored by increasing correlations between use intensity and self-contingencies regarding particular social relationships: family, learning groups or significant others. Accordingly, the conclusion was drawn that, over time, practically any self-contingency (except God's love) fosters increases in the individual use intensity of social media.

Key words: contingencies self-worth, Hungary, Facebook, Facebook use intensity

1. Introduction

The importance of low self-esteem in relation to Facebook use, specifically social media overuse and addiction, has been emphasised extensively (e.g. Steinfeld et al., 2008; Hughes et al., 2012; de Cock et al., 2014). Facebook can facilitate compensatory self-presentation; furthermore, it provides rapid reinforcement in the form of the number of likes, particularly for individuals whose self-esteem is not supported by meaningful life goals that provide a connection to peers. Several authors have emphasised the importance of self-related peer information to explain the use of Facebook (Burrow, Rainone, 2017; Burwell et al., 2018). Hence, the conceptual framework of self-worth contingency theory (Crocker, Wolfe, 2001) suggests that others' approval contingency should be related to social media use intensity, and this assumption has been confirmed (e.g. Kanat-Maymon et al., 2018). Thus, in this study, further consideration was made of findings using contingent self-esteem theory to explain Facebook use, formulating numerous expectations regarding the relationship of the importance of contingencies with Facebook use. This research therefore observed a correlation with the intensity of Facebook use for all contingencies, confirming the central importance of the construct of self-worth to explain Facebook use.

2. Socialising on Facebook

2.1. Increasing Facebook usage

According to the data relevant to this study and its sample, 42.10% of inhabitants of Hungary used Facebook in 2014, the year in which the first sample of the present authors was collected (Toth, Mirnics, 2014). By the time the second sample was obtained, this number had increased significantly to 60.30% (Facebook Hungary, 2018). Therefore, Facebook is the most important social networking site in Hungary. There is already a large body of empirical data on the popularity and occasionally excessive use of Facebook (e.g. Kittinger et al., 2012; Hormes et al., 2014; Pontes et al., 2015). According to a study by M. A. Kiss (2021), among a sample of people who use their smartphones more than normal users, a person spends, on average, between one and three hours on social networking sites. A meta-analysis by C. Marino et al. (2018), which summarised the results of 56 articles with a sample of nearly 28,000 us-

ers, indicated that problematic Facebook use is distinct from internet addiction and should be considered a separate phenomenon. Their results showed that problematic Facebook use is positively correlated with the amount of time spent online and with internet addiction but is negatively correlated with self-esteem. According to a Hungarian study (Poto 2012), both university and high school students access Facebook approximately four times per day, with high school students spending, on average, 43 minutes per visit, while university students spend an average of 33 minutes, totaling approximately two hours per day. Although it is difficult to clarify these estimates, a university student thus spends approximately 730 hours per year on Facebook. This usage time has increased since 2012 and has affected an increasing number of people, as social media use, particularly Facebook use, has risen.

2.2. How Facebook meets social needs

There have been several studies of the role of Facebook in fostering social relationships. The platform satisfies social needs by helping to build and maintain relationships, thereby increasing life satisfaction and building trust between people (e.g. Valenzuela et al., 2009; Joo, Teng, 2017; Himat 2020; Lasode et al., 2020). Moreover, since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Facebook has been used more often than previously to alleviate feelings of social isolation (Toquero, Talidong, 2021).

2.3. The downside of Facebook: problematic use

As Facebook has become an increasingly popular platform for social interaction, researchers have also started to evaluate its dark side. Users find controlling the amount of time spent on Facebook incredibly difficult (Lee et al., 2012), and maintaining this control is especially difficult for young people (Koc, Gulyagci, 2013). C. Marino et al. (2018), in their meta-analysis based on approximately fifty articles, suggested that, compared to problematic internet use, problematic Facebook use has more individual characteristics since it meets specific psychological needs. Some authors have identified Facebook addiction, which has also been the subject of individual studies (Andraessen et al., 2011; Griffiths et al., 2014; Bányai et al., 2017). Addiction is defined as the continued engagement in substance abuse or particular behav-

aviours despite their adverse consequences. Facebook addiction thus refers to the inability of users to set limits on their Facebook use despite the adverse consequences for them (e.g. disrupted relationships or performance deficits). Among the personality factors that predispose one to addiction, D. J. Hughes et al. (2012) identified poor self-regulation, a preference for online interaction, and maladaptive thinking about the identity segments on Facebook. A recent meta-analysis (Ryan et al., 2014) showed that Facebook addiction is associated with low well-being, loneliness and a tendency towards depression; the relevant and recurring factor is that such individuals use Facebook to prevent boredom and to obtain social support to regulate and/or lift their moods. Similar results have been found by A. L. Ferris and E. E. Hollenbaugh (2018), who demonstrated a positive link of Facebook addiction with low self-esteem, introversion and neuroticism. Previous studies have also shown that Facebook overuse induces academic underachievement (e.g. Hegazy et al., 2021; Hughes et al., 2021).

2.4. The link between low self-esteem and Facebook use

The relationship between low self-esteem and Facebook use is effectively explained by the social compensation hypothesis (Valkenburg et al., 2005; Zywicki, Danowski, 2008; Ferris, Hollenbaugh, 2018), which suggests that people with low self-esteem tend to use Facebook more frequently because it helps them to shape the impressions that they form about themselves regarding others to better satisfy their need for belonging. Low self-esteem is therefore a key risk factor for maladaptive social network use (e.g. Steinfeld 2008; de Cock et al, 2014) because Facebook users are highly susceptible to rapid self-esteem reinforcements from others (Burrow, Rainone, 2017; Burwell et al., 2018). Notably, however, not all researchers have found low self-esteem to be the primary mechanism for excessive social network use. According to social enhancement theory, Facebook use is primarily associated with individuals who are active and popular offline, further strengthening their extant social relationships (Kraut et al., 2002; Valkenburg et al., 2005; Zywicki, Danowski, 2008). According to the meta-analysis by C. Marino et al. (2018), both approaches are consistent with users' motivation to reduce negative emotional states, capably regulate emotions and attempt to satisfy internal and emotional needs. These processes might also be relat-

ed to contingencies of self-worth, which shape self-worth through similar mechanisms.

3. Contingencies of self-worth

3.1. The concept of contingencies of self-worth

Early theories initially conceived self-worth as one dimensional (Piers 1969), although it was later perceived to be multidimensional (Marsh 1993). Regardless of the number of dimensions, studies have shown that positive events alone do not always lead to an increase in self-esteem (Maricutoiu et al., 2012). J. Crocker and C. T. Wolfe (2001) thus identified seven distinct aspects, i.e. contingencies, which underpin self-evaluation. They theorised that not all contingencies are equally important to an individual; hence, a change in self-worth as a result of an effect is most likely to occur if a contingency important to the person is targeted. Second, self-esteem is influenced by the extent to which people feel that they meet the claims that their personally important contingencies exert on themselves. For example, students for whom the contingency of academic competence is important experience greater fluctuations in their self-worth when they receive feedback on academic achievement than those for whom other contingencies are important (Crocker et al., 2002). Importantly, contingencies have been shown to be stable (Park et al., 2004). Moreover, according to M. A. Stefanone et al. (2011), contingencies of self-worth can be classified into two groups: public contingencies (others' approval, appearance, competition) and private contingencies (family support, virtue, God's love). Those for whom public contingencies are more important have lower self-esteem (Kernis et al., 2008), more depressive symptoms (Schöne et al., 2015), and lower levels of overall well-being (Schöne et al., 2015). In contrast, among university students, the importance of private contingencies is negatively connected to problematic behaviours, e.g. excessive alcohol consumption or eating disorders (Crocker, Knight, 2005).

3.2. The link between contingencies of self-worth and Facebook use

The relationship between certain aspects of contingencies of self-worth and Facebook use has already been shown in the literature. According to the study by

M. A. Stefanone et al. (2011), private contingencies are negatively associated with excessive social network activity. Y. Kanat-Maymon et al. (2018), who specifically included the aspect of others' approval in their study, found that others' approval contingency is strongly associated with excessive internet use and Facebook addiction. In general, salient research has not only investigated the rough correlations between contingencies and social media use intensity but has also linked specific aspects of Facebook use to self-worth contingencies. For example, an international comparative study (Prieler et al., 2021) found that the more important that others' approval contingency is to Asian and European women, the more dissatisfied that they are with their own bodies. This finding affirms that of N. M. Overstreet and D. M. Quinn (2012), who specifically observed that users who rate the contingency of others' approval as the most important compared themselves to others on Facebook more often than other users. Z. Yue and M. A. Stefanone (2021) also demonstrated a positive and significant relationship between the importance of others' approval contingency and sharing selfies on social media.

4. Empirical study

4.1. Questions and hypotheses

Given the research and findings discussed above, a reasonable question is whether the growing prevalence of social media has an impact on the relationship between Facebook use intensity and self-contingencies. To address this question, in this research hypothesis, it was hypothesised that there is a correlation between the importance of an aspect and Facebook use if aspect-relevant information is available. Furthermore, the extent of such positive relatedness will likely increase with a growing number of users. Accordingly, an examination was performed of the possible correlation of each self-contingency with use intensity separately. Since there is a positive correlation between others' approval contingency and excessive Facebook use (Kanat-Maymon et al., 2018; Yue, Stefanone, 2021), the hypothesis was that the more widespread that Facebook is, and consequently the more people that an individual knows on Facebook, the greater that the use intensity is. In other words, as the use of Facebook increases, peer feedback is increasingly sought on social media by

individuals who are particularly receptive to it. With respect to the family support contingency, the research hypothesis is that a person will use Facebook more often when he or she supposes that his or her family members will also use it; otherwise, he or she will not. The more prevalent that Facebook is, the stronger that the relationship between family support contingency and Facebook use intensity will be. This expectation is supported by many people currently communicating with their family members mostly through this social media network (Joo, Teng, 2017). Regarding competition contingency, the assumption was that the relationship between the importance of this aspect and use intensity becomes stronger over time since competing partners will increasingly use social media. Additionally, a positive correlation is assumed between the importance of appearance contingency and Facebook use intensity since the platform offers numerous photos and other visual stimuli. Thus, by its very nature, it favours the transmission of superficial external information. Since no specific partner (family member, rival) is needed to examine the success of meeting appearance criteria, the prevalence of Facebook use should not affect the relationship between the importance of appearance contingency and use intensity. T. Davidson and K. F. Lee (2014) also found that rather religious individuals report greater levels of Facebook-related anxiety; however, M. A. Stefanone et al. (2011) could not identify any association between this "God's love contingency" and Facebook use intensity. Accordingly, the hypothesis was that the spread of Facebook does not affect the association between use intensity and this contingency. In relation to the contingency of virtue, which also belongs to the group of private contingencies and is therefore rather personal, the assumption was that it does not change in the relationship between self-contingency and use intensity, which is believed to be negative according to M. A. Stefanone et al. (2011). Finally, concerning the academic competence contingency, research has posited a higher positive correlation with Facebook use intensity as this social media network becomes more pervasive as a platform for learning through its presence in study groups and its use for sharing of information.

In summary, there are relationships between Facebook and the importance of contingencies that can be considered stable due to the nature of social media, and there are similar relationships that will change over time; i.e. they will become in-

creasingly strong as the use of Facebook becomes increasingly widespread. Specifically, for a useful evaluation of the contingencies of competition, academic competence, family support, and others' approval, their relevant personal acquaintances must use Facebook. However, concerning the contingencies of virtue and God's love, individual Facebook use intensity is less likely to depend on the social media use of personal acquaintances. Finally, an evaluation involving the appearance contingency can be effective even among strangers; thus, the link between the importance of self-contingency and Facebook use intensity is not expected to change over time.

4.2. Procedure and participants

To answer the research questions and test the hypotheses, the method was chosen of comparing the experiences of two measurements that were far apart in time. The two measurements, which were obtained approximately four years apart, did not involve the same individuals but persons from similar immersion backgrounds since they were all students at the Apor Vilmos Catholic College with a wide variety of majors. Typically, students are not in their courses for such a long period of time. The requirement for participation, which was voluntary and for which no compensation was provided, was a current Facebook membership. The implementation of the present study was approved by the responsible ethics committee. The participants were fully informed about the study and provided their informed consent to participate online. During the period between the two measurements, Facebook use in Hungary and worldwide increased greatly. For contingencies necessitating person-specific peer information, it is reasonable to assume that, if more of a person's specific acquaintances use Facebook, the correlation between the importance of a contingency and social media use intensity will increase. These self-contingencies are others' approval, competition, academic competence, and family support. The importance of God's love, virtue and appearance contingencies to Facebook use intensity is, due to the nature of Facebook, unlikely to depend on the extent of acquaintances using this social media platform.

The first data collection in 2014 included 831 subjects, and the second data collection in 2018 included 224 subjects. There were 131 men in the first sample and

22 in the second, with average ages of 26 and 30 years old, respectively, and standard deviations of eight and ten years. Although men were in the minority compared to women in both measurements, the proportion of men was larger in the first data collection.

4.3. Measurements

Demographics. Respondents indicated their age and sex. Since they all were university students, questions did not address education.

Facebook questionnaire. Regarding Facebook use intensity, the questionnaire asked about the respondents' frequency of visits, how often they used Facebook and how many approved acquaintances that they had. Frequency of use was answered with a five-point scale from 1 to 5, where 1 was "I use Facebook less often than daily", 2 was "daily", 3 was "several times per day", 4 was "every hour during the day", and 5 was "I am on it almost all the time".

Contingencies of self-worth were assessed with the 35-item, seven-point Likert scale questionnaire proposed by J. Crocker et al. (2003). The scale identifies seven contingencies as follows: others' approval, e.g. "I cannot respect myself if others do not respect me"; appearance, e.g. "When I think I look attractive, I feel good about myself"; competition, e.g. "My self-worth is affected by how well I do when I am competing against others"; academic competence, e.g. "I feel better about myself when I know I'm doing well academically"; family support, e.g. "Knowing that my family members love me makes me feel good about myself"; virtue, e.g. "Whenever I follow my moral principles, my sense of self-respect receives a boost" and God's love, e.g. "My self-esteem goes up when I feel that God loves me". Exploratory factor analysis was used and revealed two dimensions that corresponded to the previous research findings of M. A. Stefanone et al. (2011). These dimensions comprised the group of private contingencies (Stefanone et al., 2011; Toth, Mirnics, 2014) and included the contingencies of family support, virtue, and God's love, while the group of public contingencies included others' approval, appearance, competition and academic competence.

4.4. Results

Table 1 shows Cronbach's alpha values from data collections 1 and 2, means for frequency of use and number of acquaintances, the mean values for different contingencies, and the Z values from Mann-Whitney-U tests and p values. The scales showed good consistency with respect to all contingencies and data collections. The two samples did not differ in their frequency of use but differed in the number of acquaintances. For those who participated in the second data collection, competition and appearance mattered less, while the God's love contingency mattered more.

Table 1. Frequency of use and number of acquaintances by data collection and Cronbach's α values and means by contingencies

Variables	α_1	α_2	Mean 1	Mean 2	Z	p
Frequency of use			2.637	2.705	-0.896	0.370
Number of acquaintances			471.687	583.442	-3.332	0.001
Family support	0.782	0.775	5.327	5.365	-0.750	0.450
Competition	0.849	0.910	4.981	4.485	-4.419	0.001
Appearance	0.723	0.759	4.839	4.590	-2.562	0.010
God's love	0.958	0.954	3.633	4.176	-3.450	0.001
Academic competence	0.795	0.801	5.075	4.932	-1.493	0.130
Virtue	0.718	0.709	5.167	5.293	-1.501	0.130
Others' approval	0.842	0.827	4.013	4.036	-0.114	0.910

Source: Own research (n1 = 831, n2 = 224)

Table 2 shows the relationships among age, frequency of use and number of acquaintances in data collection 1 and 2. Clearly, younger people used Facebook more often and had more acquaintances. Age and frequency of use were thus positively correlated in both data collections.

Table 2. Relationships among age, frequency of use and number of acquaintances in data collection 1 and 2 (rho values)

Variables	Data collection 1		Data collection 2	
	Frequency of use	Number of acquaintances	Frequency of use	Number of acquaintances
Age	-0.320**	-0.345**	-0.410**	-0.400**
Frequency of use		0.320**		0.376**

Source: Own research (n1 = 831, n2 = 224; ** p < 0.01)

Table 3 shows how the frequency of Facebook use and number of acquaintances in the two measures were related to the importance of different self-worth contingencies. In relation to the frequency of use, the results showed that there are temporally stable and variable aspects.

Table 3. The importance of contingencies regarding Facebook use frequency and number of acquaintances (rho values)

Contingency	Frequency of FB use		Number of approved acquaintances	
	Data collection	Data collection	Data collection	Data collection
	1	2	1	2
Family support	-0.127**	0.039	0.047	0.087
Competition	0.111*	0.192**	0.100**	0.103
Appearance	0.170**	0.245**	0.026	0.144*
God's love	-0.135**	-0.182**	0.033	-0.029
Academic competence	0.049	0.187**	0.054	0.117
Virtue	-0.166**	-0.079	-0.047	0.026
Others' approval	0.027	0.182**	-0.025	0.095

Source: Own research (n1 = 831, n2 = 224; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01)

There is a stable correlation over time among the patterns of the competition, appearance, and God's love contingencies. Those paying more attention to appear-

ance and those emphasising the competition contingency used Facebook more intensively than people with less interest in these two contingencies in both the first and second data collections. In contrast, those with an important God's love contingency used Facebook less.

Changes were observed in the other four contingencies. While in the first sample, those who reported family support and virtue as more important used Facebook less, this case was no longer true for the second sample. However, for the academic competence and others' approval contingencies, a positive relationship was only found between Facebook use and these contingencies in the second measure.

Although there was a correlation between frequency of use and number of acquaintances in both measurements, the self-worth contingencies showed little correlation with the number of acquaintances. Only in the domains of the competition contingency (first measurement) and the appearance contingency (second measurement) were positive correlations with the number of acquaintances observed.

5. Discussion

Based on these results, over time, practically any self-contingency (except God's love) pushes a person increasingly towards more intense use of social media. This finding affirms the suggestion that contingencies of self-worth are a promising concept for understanding the intensity of Facebook use. However, the results of this research should be interpreted with caution considering the imbalances in the numbers of participants and distributions of gender in the two samples. In the samples, these imbalances like occurred because the college that the participants attended had mostly female students (kindergarten teachers, teachers). However, the overrepresentation of women in a sample has also been found in many other studies (Wilson et al., 2010; Alabi 2013; Wolniczak et al., 2013; Eijnden et al., 2016; Jafarkarimi et al., 2016), most likely because of women's gendered role in offering cooperative replies to requests for participation in the included studies.

A correlation was found between the frequency of use and each of the seven self-assessment contingencies. Of these contingencies, some were specific to only one of the measures, so the hypothesis concerning change over time was confirmed. No-

tably, the correlation of the others' approval contingency and use intensity in the second measurement mirrored the correlation of Y. Kanat-Maymon et al. (2018), who pointed out that the others' approval contingency is able to predict Facebook addiction and excessive internet use. That this correlation was only observed in the second sample could be explained by the pool of users and thus the pool of acquaintances and feedback providers having to be quite large to receive satisfactorily intense feedback from Facebook. Thus, this finding affirms the hypothesis that there are relationships between self-contingencies and Facebook use, which become increasingly stronger as the use of this social media network becomes increasingly widespread. Specifically, those relationships of certain self-contingencies, i.e. competition, others' approval, family support and academic competence, with Facebook use intensity are expected to strengthen when the identity of a significant feedback provider is crucial. Thus, several other time-varying correlations beyond the correlation between others' approval and Facebook use were identified: the connection between competition and Facebook use intensity changed somewhat, and the correlation became stronger. The assumption is that the correlation between the academic competence contingency and the frequency of Facebook use among students has increased in the context of the increasing use of social media; thus, the hypothesis on this point is also supported. Furthermore, since family members have likely started to interact more on Facebook, the association with the family support contingency has changed in line with the hypothesis. How common Facebook has become for family communication was indicated by T. M. Joo and C. E. Teng (2017), who described how 90% of their respondents said that they interact with family members on Facebook more than in person. With the increasing expansion of this social networking site and growing numbers of friends, Facebook has presumably become more normative, which might be a reason for the disappearance of the negative relationship between Facebook use intensity and virtue contingency. Thus, this hypothesis was not confirmed since no change was expected.

Correlations that did not change over time were also identified (the contingencies of appearance and God's love), so assumptions about these essential correlations were confirmed. These correlations might be due to the nature of Facebook commu-

nication, which has always tended to focus more on external aspects, rapid and attention-attracting information, and social comparisons (competition) and less on deep and elaborate thoughts. Facebook is highly suited to obtaining quick reinforcements of the aspects of self-worth that concern externalities (Stefanone et al., 2011; Pounders et al., 2016). Thus, the content that people share about themselves on social networks can be considered specific forms of behaviour that aim to create and maintain positive impressions of themselves (Yue, Stefanone, 2021).

The above characteristics of overall superficiality likely reflect that Facebook use, like all media use, can be characterised by the quality of consumption in addition to the quantity. Of course, it is also possible to read quality literature, attend theatre performances or concerts, listen to scientific or public debates and even conduct worship services on Facebook. Particularly during the period of physical remoteness entailed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the above activities were practically exclusively available on the internet and, in many cases, on Facebook. Accordingly, many individuals who had not been Facebook users before became social media users, sometimes by necessity. Further research comparing Facebook use with the contingences of self-worth should also consider these qualitative aspects. Nevertheless, research thus far has suggested that people become addicted to Facebook primarily due to its social interaction potential rather than as impersonal consumers of content designed for a larger audience (Aksoy 2018).

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Wpłynęło/received 21.12.2021; poprawiono/revised 07.04.2022

Eseje
Essays

**Revolutionising of Jewish and Ukrainian prisoners of war
in Freistadt Camp, Austria-Hungary (1915-1917):
social dimension**

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Abstract

The article analyses the process of revolutionisation of captured Ukrainians and Jews, which was started by the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine after first successes of Ukrainian propaganda in the Freistadt Prisoners of War camp. The Ukrainisation of the camp's inhabitants and their public awareness initiated complex processes of differentiation among the campers, as a result of which they might be divided into three numerically unequal groups – at the very beginning just a few supported the Ukrainian national liberation slogans, the Black Hundred minority of prisoners stood for “Faith,

Tsar and Fatherland”, the third largest group of captives, without having their own worldview, initially followed the Black Hundreds and “Lesser Russians”.

The Black Hundreds made every effort to prevent or at least slow down the process of national and social awakening of the captured Ukrainians and Jews in Freistadt, using also the arrival of A. V. Romanova, the Sister of Mercy. There is every reason to believe that the main tasks of her mission to the camp were propaganda and mobilisation aimed at the Black Hundreds and “Lesser Russians”, and provocation and dissociation concerning members of Ukrainian and Jewish camp organisations. So, it is not surprising, that some members of the camp community used rather radical and even insulting remarks about her. It is obvious that the captives should not have “moved on to personalities”, but the “sister” did everything she could to set a conscious part of the camp community against herself.

Further development of national-patriotic activities led to gradual destruction of the Black Hundred ideology in the minds of prisoners, destroying at the same time “Lesser Russian” ideas in the worldview of Ukrainians. Ukrainian and Jewish activists of the camp managed to develop national cultural and educational centres and attract the majority of the campers to participate in them. Hidden opponents of the Ukrainian and Jewish national ideas no longer dared to oppose them openly, and the camp was more and more gaining its national character, having turned into the centre of Ukrainian life in Austria-Hungary.

Such a high level of self-organisation of captive Ukrainians and Jews caused the Austro-Hungarian authorities to intensify the process of revolutionising the camp, using somewhat unusual (for captivity conditions) forms. It concerned celebration of the 1 of May, when symbols of red colours and appropriate slogans were used, which was strictly prohibited for the subjects of the Austrian emperor during the war. However, all the conditions were created for the prisoners of war to celebrate this holiday, expecting that sooner or later they would return home and spread the patterns of social activities they have experienced.

Key words: captured Ukrainians and Jews, Black Hundreds, public awareness, Freistadt camp, Austria-Hungary.

1. Introduction. Historiography of the problem

Historiography of the problem of the Jewish national organization’s establishment and its activities in the Freistadt POW camp for Ukrainian soldiers has already been analysed in details (Sribnyak et al., 2021). Therefore, it is worth mentioning only main papers by Ukrainian researchers, demonstrating a gradual increase of historical knowledge on the topic (Sribnyak 1999, 2001, 2017, 2021; Kryvosheyeva 2004). Austrian scholars also made a significant contribution to this process, referring to the ma-

terials of the Austrian State Archives (*Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv*), which deposited documents of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of War (*Kaiserliche und Königliche Kriegsministerums, 1914-1919*) - (Rappersberger 1988; Fellner 1989: 3-32).

Despite, however, the introduction of a large number of archival documents into scientific circulation, the need to enrich the source base concerning the problem of cooperation between Ukrainian and Jewish organisations in the Freistadt POW camp remains topical. Studying materials stored in the Library and Archives of Canada (The Andry Zhuk Collection) is of particular importance. Valuable source information can also be found in the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" collection, which contains memoirs by former members of this Ukrainian organisation who were most actively involved in the development of cultural, national and socio-political work in the Freistadt camp (Danylenko 1979; Dubrivnyy 1979; Simovych 1979). It should be emphasized on the expediency of using as a source the memories by O. Varava, the prisoner of war, who remained for a long time in the Freistadt camp (Kobets' 1959: 349-370).

While preparing this survey, the authors were to consider what kind of the creative method should be applied by a war historian, as the history of captivity is an integral part of all wars. There is probably no unequivocal answer to this question, although there is every reason to believe that no research technique is universal and any method does not cover all the multidimensionality and complexity of war and captivity as historical phenomena. At the same time, it can be argued that the scientific elaboration of the problem of keeping prisoners of different nationalities in the POW camps of Austria-Hungary highlights the need for an in-depth interpretation of the empirical material.

In the context of this point of view, it seems appropriate to use the instruments of the narrative methodology, which provides a description of the social phenomenon (in this case: solidarity in the struggle of the two oppressed nations in the Russian Empire - Ukrainian and Jewish - against Russian chauvinism, the struggle which unfolded in conditions of camp isolation and led to their revolutionising). The

application of this method required consistency in the presentation of events, ordering and openness of the final result.

The narrative in a broad sense is both a method and a central characteristic of the object of study, including cultural, interpretational and identity-focused aspects. It should also be emphasized that the historical narrative is characterised primarily by its concentration on micro-processes, event orientation, temporality, linear dependence of depicted phenomena and processes.

The methods used by the present authors include military anthropology, focused on the study of worldviews, sign systems and fundamental forms of human behaviour, mostly hidden and not clearly articulated. Such concealment requires its decoding, penetration into the hidden layers of consciousness of both prisoners and certain national groups in their environment. While using methodology of social determinism it became possible to analyse general psychological state of the prisoners in camp isolation.

2. Presentation of the research problem

2.1. Ukrainian community of the camp in its struggle against the Russian Black Hundreds

In October 1914, the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (ULU) began preparations for the Ukrainianisation of the camp of prisoners of war in Freistadt (*K.u.k. Kriegsgefangenen-lager in Freistadt, Oberösterreich*), which primarily concerned the improvement of food and living conditions of the campers. Equally important was regulation of a number of organisational and financial aspects, viz. the official consent of the Austria-Hungarian Ministry of War to carry out national educational and political activities by ULU, as well as the removal prisoners of other nationalities from captivity (first of all Russians, in particular those having clearly chauvinistic beliefs – the Black Hundreds).

The process of Ukrainisation of the camp began in November 1914, when the Union received the official permission from Austrian military authorities. After that, Mykhailo Havrylko, the ULU representative, was delegated to the camp, whose activities led to creation of the first grouping of Ukrainian prisoners of war, aimed at

separation of Ukraine from Russia. However, the rising of pro-independence slogans by the members of this grouping caused a resistance of those prisoners having in their minds remnants of Russian patriotic stereotypes and frantic agitation of the Black Hundreds against the Ukrainian liberation idea in the camp. Under the influence of this, most of the prisoners considered the ULU representatives to be “Austrians”, “aliens”, and even “spies” acting against tsarist Russia and treated them with great distrust.

Adherents of the Russian monarchical idea and Slavic “unity” had the whole arsenal of methods to intimidate Ukrainians in the camps, including threats of physical violence and beatings Ukrainian activists; throwing stones at the windows of barracks where Ukrainian studies and lectures took place; destruction of Ukrainian-language printed materials and camp publications; obstacles to holding national events by singing “God Save the King”. They also threatened to insert the numbers and names of Ukrainian activists into the “Black Book” with its subsequent transfer to the Russian counterintelligence (which could cause harm to their relatives); to damage the equipment at schools and other Ukrainian institutions, to give up any humanitarian aid in case of its Ukrainian origin; to avoid attendance of Ukrainian schools and participation in any national and organisational work in the camps. Besides, the Black Hundreds used other methods of intimidation in the camps, including toss of threatening letters to Ukrainian barracks.

These actions deterred campers from participation in the social and national life of the camp, and eventually forced the ULU to temporarily give up proclaiming independence slogans among the captured Ukrainians. At the same time, the officials of the ULU decided to intensify cultural and educational work among the campers, and in mid-December 1914 sent Dr Vasyl Simovich to Freistadt, and in some time – Mykola Golubets and Osyp Bezpalko. At the same time, in a similar way did the “Black Hundred”, which used a duty option in its subversive activities, viz. the wearing of a special badge (armband) by German language students and their exemption from compulsory labour in the camp. This circumstance gave rise to many conflicts, as a number of prisoners, together with the elders of the barracks, actively resisted

the students of this course: “they did not give bread, lunch, snatched books from their hands, tore and threw them into antics” (Simovych 1979: 87).

However, it did not stop the work, proving the futility of all attempts by the “Black Hundred” to disrupt educational work in the camp. Meanwhile, at this time the ULU Education Department absolutely changed the focus of its work, concentrating on discussions of pure social issues and explaining the expediency of removing Black Hundreds from the camp as soon as possible and replacing the elders of the barracks by pro-Ukrainian people. Eventually, during spring and summer of 1915, the camp got rid of the fiercest Black Hundreds (who were moved to multinational prisoner-of-war camps for the Russian army soldiers), however a significant number of them remained in the camp. The latter made every effort to fight against Ukrainianness, although they should have avoided open demonstrations against Ukrainians, as would have been punished by being transferred to another camp.

All this time, Ukrainian activists had to take into account one more circumstance that complicated national and organisational and public work in the camp, as noted in his letter to the ULU Presidium of 15 September 1915, the Head of the camp education department Roman Dombchevsky. In the mentioned letter, he pointed out that “even now we have a significant number of Jewish prisoners, who in every way have different privileges, exploit others, hinder our work, especially in the field of music, are openly hostile to those co-prisoners who are beginning to become conscious Ukrainians. Those Jews dare make insulting expressions [statements] against Ukraine. They do all this because they have shoulders backing them” (CDAVO f: 52verso). While mentioning “shoulders” R. Dombchevsky obviously meant that they were supported and patronised in the appointment to various camp positions by the Jews from among the employees of the Austrian commandant’s office of the camp.

Due to successful Ukrainian action in Freistadt, the wave of anti-Ukrainian hysteria in the camp gradually began to fade, which enabled to found the “Club for Studying Social Issues” (“Social Club”) – (CDAVO b: 4) in late March, causing significant expansion of those sympathising the Ukrainian cause. And as soon as in August 1915, it became possible to form a “Social and Educational Circle” (SEC) from among the Ukrainian prisoners, whose members, together with ULU representatives,

resumed their political work among the prisoners “in the Ukrainian, patriotic, anti-Russian spirit” (LaAC). To this end, at the meetings of its members, socio-political problems were discussed, after which Ukrainian activists raised the issues in barracks, discussing them in the presence of a wider circle of prisoners.

Thus, in particular, on 7 November 1915, at the SEC regular meeting, the issue of “What the democratic state should be, for which we have to fight” was debated. In his presentation, prisoner Pochepaylo noted that “in order to be a democratic state, it is necessary first all to get rid of the tsar and all his ministers. It is necessary to seek all political rights [...] so that the state is ruled by the people”. Members of the SEC Education Department Jacko Ostapchuk and Osyp Okhrymovych took part in the discussion. The first stressed that Ukrainians “must seek autonomy wherever we are, either in Russia or in Austria”, and O. Okhrymovych concluded: “if we want to live our own lives, we must seek political and national rights” (CDAVO a: 22).

It was also important that daily courses of “social” sciences were held for all comers in the camp, which included lectures on the history of culture, sociology, political economy, state law, national studies and history of Ukraine, which were intended for more educated prisoners gathering from 100 to 300 people (LaAC). Finally, the prisoners could learn the basics of public life at *viches* (general meetings of all prisoners), which were regularly convened to discuss recent political and military events, as well as issues related to the everyday life of the campers. *Viches*, chaired by members of the SEC Education Department, gathered up to several hundred prisoners and were an effective and efficient means of national-patriotic and public education of Ukrainian prisoners (Rozvaha 1917: 4). An effective means for social development and national awareness of prisoners was the “Rozvaha” camp magazine published since June 1915.

Thanks to these activities, by the end of the year a small group of Ukrainians showed their willingness to secretly leave for Ukraine in order to undermine the rear of the tsarist army by carrying out revolutionary propaganda. According to archival documents, some of them were transported to Ukraine, where they carried out special and propaganda tasks of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. However, to determine whether their shadow activities were effective is a rather problematic task,

though in any case it can be argued that the returnees have contributed into the revolutionising of Ukrainian society and future overthrow of the Russian tsarism.

It should be mentioned that the Ukrainianisation of the camp and carrying out the large-scale cultural, national and socio-political activities there, was used not only by the captured Ukrainians, but also by the Jews who came from Ukrainian lands. Having suffered in a similar way mainly from the Russian Black Hundreds and remembering or sometimes even surviving the recent Jewish pogroms during the First Russian Revolution, the captured Jews in Freistadt found it useful for themselves to remain in the POW camp for Ukrainians, where they were given every opportunity for national and public self-realisation (Sribnyak 2021; Sribnyak et al., 2021).

While, however, promoting the Ukrainian and Jewish national movements in the Freistadt camp and even using them to their advantage, Austro-Hungarian authorities retained freedom of manoeuvre at the foreign political stage, hoping to conclude (under favourable circumstances) a separate peace agreement with tsarist Russia. To this end, the Austro-Hungarian military department tried to distance itself as much as possible from the ULU and the political component in its activities. Moreover, in some of the “sensitive” issues for the Russians, official Vienna resorted to various curtsseys in front of Russian authorities, following sometimes in the footsteps of their chauvinistic-great-power policy.

Among such irritating moments in bilateral Austrian-Russian relations (apart from the military component, as the two countries pursued active hostilities against each other) was the Austrian veiled support of the development of Ukrainian and Jewish national-liberation idea in the Freistadt camp. And although the Austrians were aware that this information was no longer a secret to Russian intelligence, they tried to limit the possible negative publicity in Russian government about the national separation of Ukrainian prisoners of war from the tsarist army, because under some circumstances it could significantly complicate official Vienna’s achievement of signing a truce with St. Petersburg. As a result, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry tried not to send unnecessary “negative signals” to the Russian ruling establishment, sometimes making a beautiful face in a bad game.

2.2. Ukrainian and Jewish camp organisations facing the Russian Sister of Mercy's visit

Duality and inconsistency of Austrian authorities became especially evident during a visit to the Freistadt camp made by Alexandra V. Romanova (in archival documents her initials are erroneously given as "V. K."), the Sister of Mercy of the Red Cross Petrograd Community of St. George. Her arrival at the camp became an effective catalyst for the Black Hundreds' activities, which decided to use this situation in their actions against Ukrainians. The very preparation for her arrival in Freistadt met all the worst expectations of the campers, but strict demands of the commandant's office made Ukrainian and Jewish national organisations agree with the decision concerning a "passive" attitude to her visit. The Austrians also demanded that organised Ukrainians and Jews in no way demonstrate the Freistadt's national character (either Ukrainian or Jewish), to the eminent visitor. Realizing that A. Romanova's visit was caused not so much by intentions to help the prisoners as by the desire of the Russians to find out their moods and real attitude to the tsarist government, put the heads of Ukrainian and Jewish organisations in a rather difficult situation (CDAVO d: 5).

This was also stated in the undated "Protest" (apparently, it was written ex post facto), signed by members of the Ukrainian political organisation board (including its chairman Ivan Lazko). It said that before her arrival in Freistadt, "the officials instructed to hide everything that testifies to the nature of the work done here". The commandant's office instructed to treat the Sister as loyally as possible, moreover, a few days before her arrival "all prisoners were taken to trainings and ordered to greet her with cheers when the Sister would enter the barracks". And although members of the Ukrainian organisation had another opinion on how to meet her, they were "completely paralysed" by the commandant office's orders (CDAVO f: 295; CDAVO c: 1).

On 2 January 1916, A. Romanova arrived in Freistadt, where she was present at the consecration of the church in the third section of the camp on the same day. Initially, there was a certain distance between A. Romanova and the Ukrainians, so when talking to prisoners near the church, the Sister received a negative reply to her

question “Aren’t they talking about politics here?” (as the Austrian commandant’s office wanted), although there were about 300 members of the Ukrainian SEC of Freistadt there (CDAVO f: 296).

Prisoner Serhiy Antonenko, who was witnessing her communication with the prisoners, described in his report about her first meeting with Freistadt campers: Ukrainians “behaved decently and none of us said a word about politics, but on the contrary, everyone was happy to meet her in the best way possible”. Meanwhile, the “Sister” treated the captured Ukrainians “very badly”, starting to disgrace the camp priest Petro Kateryniuk only for “not praying in the church for Tsar Nicholas II, [...] reading the word of God in Ukrainian” (obviously, according to A. Romanova, it should have been done only in Russian. But the most amusing moment is her demand concerning glorification of Moscow tsar-autocrat in Austria-Hungary, which was to be done by the camp priest P. Kateryniuk who was a subject of the Austrian Emperor.

Then A. Romanova “began to find out whether there are any Russian soldiers here pursuing politics and intimidated prisoners with all sorts of fears”. According to S. Antonenko, she obviously purposed to cause riots in the camp, so he concluded his report with a wish: “For such sisters not to be sent any more to our camp. I don’t want provocateurs” (CDAVO c: 12, 15-15verso). It should be noted that this final remark by the prisoner is extremely accurate, and fully characterises the purpose of her stay in the Ukrainian camp.

A similar comment on her visit to the camp is given in another report – by “Lazar”, the captive (perhaps it was Lazar Lozovyk), according to which it can also be concluded that the “Sister” was primarily interested in “politics”. While being in one of the barracks, she again asked the prisoners a direct question, “Aren’t they talking about politics here?”, to which heard in response – “But here all are liberating Ukraine” and was shown Ukrainian newspapers and ULU brochures. The “Sister” then asked if the prisoners attended Ukrainian schools and cultural centres, to which the Black Hundred part of the prisoners responded quite appropriately: “Yes, we attend just to hinder them” (Ukrainians).

In a while, prisoner Lazarus joined the conversation, which gained somewhat different nature, as he expressed doubts about whether the Russian tsar really cares about the fate of the prisoners, because the families of prisoners in Russia are dying of hunger without “shelter and asylum” and therefore all her appeals to hold on and remain faithful to the autocrat look as false ones. The “Sister” reacted with giving up further listening to him and called out the Austrian soldier after which Lazarus was arrested (CDAVO c: 10-11verso).

After that, A. Romanova visited another section of the camp and the infirmary. The “Sister’s visit” of the camp was a real test for the Ukrainian activists, whose national feelings were offended by clearly unworthy treatment of them by some Austrian officers and soldiers. Besides, on 3 January 1916, the “Sister” went on the offensive herself – having learnt about carrying out Ukrainian activities in the camp, she “began to threaten those who carried out such work and began to call for patriotism” (CDAVO f: 296).

Similar information about A. Romanova’s exceptionally provocative behaviour can be found in the “Protest” of the Jewish Educational Circle (dated 10 January 1916, signed by its chairman Aron Vaks, addressed to the ULU Education Department), from which it is clear that she deliberately caused indignation among the captives, because the Black Hundred began accusing Ukrainians and Jews of carrying out their national activities, while members of the camp organisations protested against these interrogations of A. Romanova, which had nothing to do with her official mission as a Red Cross representative (CDAVO d: 6).

The Chairman of the Jewish Educational Circle, A. Vaks, also submitted a report on the “Sister’s” visit to barrack No. 18, which shows that some of the prisoners present there (including A. Vaks, D. Brodsky and Boyko)¹ gave her a “cold shower” of awkward questions. Initially, in response to A. Romanova’s words about “severe punishments” in Austria, A. Vaks noted that the people in Russia serve not less sentences, mentioning that fighters against the tsarist regime were serving hard labour in Siberia, and demanded that the ‘Sister’ would address him using *you* rather than

¹ Mere personal surnames without names or their initial are given if not found in the archival documents.

thou. D. Brodsky reminded her of the 9 January 1905 events in St. Petersburg, of bullets and Cossack whips, brutal suppression of riots in Poltava and Kharkiv (CDAVO c: 37-39).

In response, the “Sister” classified such conversations as “politics”, and when she lacked arguments at all, she demanded that A. Vaks be removed from the barrack on the grounds that he was a resident of another barrack. Prior to that, she had instructed a representative of the commandant’s office to write down A. Vaks’s number and promised “troubles” for him with the commandant. Finally, A. Romanova offered prisoners the Russian-language religious literature, which the campers gave up. Completely confused by the “inhospitable” reception, the “Sister” ended the meeting with a stencil phrase – “Remember that you are Russian soldiers and Mother Russia will take care of you”, and wished that the prisoners did not listen to “people with non-Russian soul”. In response, A. Vaks reasonably remarked that “the truth stings her eyes”, and A. Romanova, criticising the “weakness” of some of the prisoners (apparently referring to A. Vaks), called on those “who are stronger” to support weak and unsure (CDAVO c: 39-40).

In the end, A. Romanova decided not to visit those barracks where the majority were Ukrainians (“away from sin!”) (CDAVO c: 43), which motivated members of the Ukrainian organisation to inform anyway the distinguished Russian representative about real political aspirations of the Ukrainians. I. Lazko was the first to speak, after which he was immediately arrested at the request of the “Sister”, and camp officer Plevka failed even to state the reason for his arrest, thus giving impression that Austrian authorities were ready to extradite “whoever chauvinistic Romanova wants”.

Prisoners Kornyatovsky and Faktorovich were also arrested (although they should be released near the guard room), while the Black Hundreds provocatively announced the future hanging of the arrested. During the “Sister’s” visit of the 1st section of the camp, the Austrians ordered that each prisoner stayed in his barrack, but if members of Ukrainian and Jewish organisations tried to enter the barrack, guards Fischer and Berger beat Ukrainians in the face and Jews were forbidden to enter (CDAVO f: 295-296 CDAVO d: 6-7).

In the end, activists of Ukrainian and Jewish organisations managed to demonstrate to A. Romanova their real attitude to her and her mission, having arranged a “warm farewell” for her. On 3 January 1916, at the entrance gate of the camp, as she boarded the carriage, slogans of “Down with autocracy!”, “Long live political freedom!” were shouted, stilled by the shouts of “Hurray!” (CDAVO c: 13-13verso). Just afterwards, according to Oleksa Loshachenko’s report, prisoner Schreyer struck in the face Pocherpailo, who had shouted the slogan. It seems a bit strange, but in this case the commandant’s office reacted properly, although not harshly enough – Schreyer was deprived of food for one day and had to work for 10 days without payment.

Summing up A. Romanova’s visit to Freistadt, it should be noted that it did not and could not lead to changes for the better for the prisoners of this camp, because in addition to a standard set of identical phrases concerning the need to follow and keep faith in the tsar, the eminent envoy brought only Russian-language religious literature. There are enough grounds to claim that A. Romanova surveyed the political views of the members of Ukrainian and Jewish camp communities, probably having received relevant instructions from the Russian secret service (although the latter statement cannot be proved with archival sources by the authors).

2.3. Temporary activation and further extinction of Black Hundred influence in the camp

A. Romanova’s stay in the camp exacerbated the situation, after her departure there were a number of local clashes in Freistadt between adherents of the Black Hundreds and Ukrainian and Jewish activists, and some of them resulted in fighting. An attempt made by the members of Jewish educational group to organise a meeting in the Tea Room was disrupted by the Black Hundreds. The worst thing was that representatives of the Austrian camp administration actually sided with the latter, which became most evident on 5 January 1916, when Lieutenant Vlakh in his address to the prisoners expressed his regret that Ukrainians and Jews dared express their protest to A. Romanova. In his opinion, it was absolutely “tactless”, because she is

a “martyr who, for the sake of relief of her imprisoned compatriots’ life, resorted to a difficult detour of the camps” (CDAVO d: 8-9).

These statements were retold by the elders of the barracks to the captives, which further intensified the Black Hundreds’ aggression against Ukrainians and Jews, “having despised” the eminent envoy – while even Austrian officers treated her with respect. Some of the most primitive prisoners, instigated by the Black Hundreds, was spreading the call for “Beating the Liberators!” and when meeting with Ukrainians and Jews, threatened them with reprisals, and sometimes moved from threats to actions (CDAVO d: 9-10).

This was done, in particular, by the Black Hundred member, Fischel Rozinker (Rozecker), who on 4 January 1916 physically insulted a member of the Jewish organisation, Lazar Lozovyk. The latter, having entered the Tea Room, was “careless” to comment on unfriendly shouting by the crowd of prisoners addressed to Romanova, mentioning that everyone has the right to speak freely and no one has reason to forbid him or her to do it. In response, prisoner F. Rozinker unexpectedly hit the victim on the head with his hand, and grabbing a glass from the table, tried to go on beating L. Lozovyk (it was stopped by the prisoners standing nearby) (CDAVO d: 2).

The latter filed a complaint against F. Rozinker to the camp commandant’s office, and on 6 January 1916, at a battalion inspection, he directly addressed the camp officer, Lieutenant Vlakh, believing that Austrian authorities would fairly deal with F. Rozinker’s actions. But the latter “played to the fore” and in his turn appealed (through an interpreter) to Vlakh, explaining his actions as follows: “Because I am a Russian soldier, and Lazar Lozovyk, who accused me, offended the Russian Sister of Mercy in my presence” (CDAVO d: 13, 14).

The dirty insult of A. Romanova (whether it took place in fact) impressed the monarchical “loyal” feelings of Lieutenant Vlakh so much, that he suddenly hit L. Lozovyk in the face with all his might, shouting out obscenities and dirty curse words at the latter. He even gave up listening to any of Lozovyk’s explanations, and intended to go on beating the prisoner, but at the last moment ordered the Austrian soldier to take L. Lozovyk out of the barrack.

Paradoxically, Vlakh, an officer of the Austro-Hungarian army, behaved in the camp like a real Russian “derzhymorda (assassin)”, bowing so lowly in front of A. Romanova as if he was not an Austrian but a tsarist Black Hundred officer. He obviously had instructions from the commandant to avoid any excesses during A. Romanova’s visit to the Freistadt camp, especially since she came here as a Sister of Mercy and the International Red Cross representative, and therefore had a special “immunity” status. Some of her actions in the camp had, however, a distinctly pro-Russian connotation, aimed at mobilisation of the Black Hundred element and the camp “swamp” (“Lesser Russians”) under “United and Indivisible Russia” slogans. This Austrian officer should not have tolerated in any way, unless assumed that he was a hidden Russian “agent of influence” in this Austrian camp.

Basing on such a behaviour of the Austrian officer, the head of the Jewish educational group A. Vaks drew the attention of the ULU Education Department members to the “threatening” situation in which the national educational work in the camp may appear because of Black Hundreds’ attacks who feel their impunity due to “really Solomonic justice”, dispensed by Lieutenant Vlakh in Freistadt. Instead of promoting this work, which from the very beginning was aimed at national and political upbringing of prisoners, named and unnamed Austrian officials created a “favourable atmosphere” for the Black Hundred rampage. A. Vaks expressed his protest concerning results of the constructive work of national organisations in the camp which were consistently destroyed, and they themselves were put in “almost impossible conditions” (CDAVO d: 4, 10-11).

It is confirmed by a letter to the commandant’s office of 17 January 1916, signed by several dozen members of the Ukrainian organisation of the camp, in which prisoners inform about spreading of false rumours and gossips by the elders of barracks and Black Hundreds, and in particular that “Austria and Germany cannot help liberate Ukraine, but they can give weapons” so that the prisoners could oppose Moscow government independently. Such groundless allegations made a “terrible impression” on the campers, and all attempts to appease them were unsuccessful for several days (CDAVO c: 5).

The Black Hundred also spread other “news”, as if “Sister” Romanova had managed to achieve permission for prisoners to leave the Freistadt camp, and for them it was necessary to “be registered before departure”, and those who refused to do it, were threatened by the elders of the barracks to inform their names to Russia which demoralised even some of the prisoners loyal to Ukrainian idea. Members of the Ukrainian organisation insisted on termination of such limitless agitation held in one of the camp sections, which corresponded the interests of the commandant’s office of the camp. For this reason, all Black Hundreds agitators should be taken out of the camp, a list of them had been prepared and Ukrainians were ready to submit it to the commandant’s office. As a palliative, according to the members of the Ukrainian organisation’s idea, this category of prisoners could be “interned” in the camp itself, being separated in a large barrack, to limit their influence on the mass of the captives (CDAVO c: 5verso).

Evidently, such a prospect led to immediate retaliation, but the only opportunity for the ULU was to interpellate the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Defence to remove Lieutenant Vlakh from the Ukrainian camp because of his “Russia-centrism” and deliberate destruction of national work in Freistadt. So far no documents have been found to confirm his recall from the camp, but further development of cultural and educational work in the camp suggests that it happened soon, and the positions in the commandant’s office were occupied by responsible Austrian servicemen who were aware of the importance of strengthening national and especially consistent anti-Russian beliefs in consciousness of Ukrainians and Jews.

The events accompanying A. Romanova’s visit, as well as further activation of the Black Hundred in the camp, prompted SEC to take measures for self-defence and create the “Combat Organisation” in February 1916. Its members were supposed to “resist people who consciously hinder educational work” in the camp, while “resistance, as circumstances will require, may even be physical”, because Ukrainophobes at times “cannot understand any arguments, except physical force”. Defending the need for such measures against the Black Hundreds, the captured Ukrainian Mochulsky argued that it is how they should be fought against, because the latter

“interfere into our work at every step”, and therefore the “Combat Organization” will judge and punish them by beating without witnesses (CDAVO e: 17-17verso).

Ukrainian activist Holobrodsky disagreed with such an approach to the tasks of the “Combat Organization”, because in his opinion, such actions of “militants” “can easily lead to hooliganism, provoking an organised enemy gang with its tactics from the opposite side”, which in turn can lead to “fights and various hostilities between people”, and this will negatively affect the cultural and educational work in the camp. O. Okhrymovych, a member of the ULU Education Department, put an end to this discussion, believing that the Black Hundreds were unworthy of terrorist methods to be used against them, as in most cases this practice did not achieve its goal (CDAVO e: 17verso-18). However, the very existence of such organisation objectively cooled “hot heads” of the Black Hundred mass and forced them to avoid conflicts with Ukrainians.

And during spring 1916 the camp was rapidly changing, as well as most of its inhabitants, who had the opportunity to freely create their own national and public environment. Freistadt had every opportunity for it, having at the disposal of the campers “a barrack-theatre for a thousand spectators, a separate barrack-hall for the *viches*, meetings, sittings; separate small barracks for all kinds of cultural establishments; for a huge book collection with tens of thousands volumes collected through donations held among Galician citizens, for a photo studio, for artistic studio, the editorial office of “Rozvaha” weekly magazine and a printing house [...]. And absolutely different from other camps way of life, internal life, background and work of the prisoners. The population of the Freistadt camp had the opportunity to live a full social and cultural life” (Kobets’ 1959: 350).

2.4. Constructing a new social space for campers after the February Revolution in Russia

In early 1917, the Ukrainian community of prisoners in the Freistadt camp reached the apogee of its development, which required institutional changes in its internal life, and, in particular, a radical reorganisation of all aspects of the Ukrainian camp community on the basis of significant expansion of rights and responsibilities

of prisoners. To discuss and resolve this issue on 28 January, the Ukrainian community convened a general meeting of all members of the camp organisations, which decided to establish the Main Ukrainian Council (MUC), a prisoner-of-command unit (headquarters) to which all Ukrainian camp units would be subjected. The meeting also approved a project to reorganise all camp structures, which were to be transformed from SEC sections into self-governing statutory societies (Orhanizatsiyni formy..., 1917: 124-125).

However, despite these social transformations, there were still a large number of prisoners in the camp who remained deluded by the values of the “Russkiy Mir” (“Russian World”) while remaining loyal to the Russian tsar and, what is worst, ready for brutal violence in defence of their own ignorance and bankrupt Russian great-power imperial ideas. The 1917 February Revolution came as a shock to this category of prisoners, who were finally marginalised due to the loss of the very foundations of their backward worldview. In contrast to it, social activities of Ukrainians and Jews significantly increased, and in spring 1917, almost at every *viche* in the camp its participants approved various memoranda, appeals and statements addressed to the Provisional Government of Russia and the Central Rada of Ukraine.

Changes in socio-political consciousness of the campers became especially vivid during the celebration of the May Day holiday in the camp, which began in the evening of 30 April 1917. On that day, a meeting was held by the Jewish Social and Educational Circle for all its members in the “Jewish Intellectual Barrack”, and members of Ukrainian camp organisations and the MUC leadership were also invited. As noted in the forenote to the “ULU Visnyk” by prisoner Joseph Kazban (CDAVO g: 2-18), the apartment of this barrack “inside was decorated with large and small red flags and small multi-coloured ones. In the middle, above the red rostrum, hung a portrait of Karl Marx, [...] surrounded by fresh spruce branches and decorated with artificial flowers, with portraits of Engels and Lafargue on the sides”. Below them, the slogan “Workers of the world, unite!” in Yiddish was placed. According to J. Kazban, “everything was so clean in the barrack that it evoked a festive mood” (CDAVO g: 2).

The celebration was started by the orchestra that playing “La Marseillaise”, then “C[omrade] B.” greeted the Ukrainian guests in Ukrainian, expressing hope that

after their return to the renewed Russia, the Jewish people will go along with the Ukrainian people to gain freedom, truth and equality, that both nations will act “together to fight a common enemy – the capitalists and bourgeoisie”. Then another longer speech of political content was given criticising tsarist Russia (in Russian). The orchestra performed “Liberated Russia” composition by Ya. Schreyer after which the “New Time” poem was recited in Yiddish. Another speaker from the Jewish community (“C[omrade] M.”) said that “Russian absolutism oppressed all Russian peoples, most of all us – Jews, we were slaves of slaves for two thousand years, and in Russia we were oppressed as never before, and only now a new star of freedom has shone in front of us”. He stressed that the numerous sacrifices, put on the altar of Jewish liberation were not in vain, and thanks to them “we did not die as a nation, but lived, though oppressed, and now we will live not a slave-like but a free national life!” (CDAVO g: 3-4).

After several more artistic performances (including a Jewish choir with the “Oath” song), the MUC chairman Ivan Moroz took the floor and wished to resolve as soon as possible “all the disputes to which the Russian government managed to incite the Ukrainians on the one hand, and the Jews – on the other, so that all errors would disappear and never be repeated”. This speech by I. Moroz “was taken to heart by the Jewish organisation [...] having expressed its sincere gratitude through its speaker” (CDAVO g: 4-5).

In their turn, to celebrate the holiday of 1 May, all Ukrainian camp societies joined their efforts and organised a festive march of the campers with orchestra and chorus to the “local” of “Ukrainian Tea-Room”, and “in the front, its participants carried both red flags and their yellow-and-blue one”. At the same time, the orchestra was performing “La Marseillaise”, the chorus – “Boldly, comrades, keep up!” song. After the march, I. Moroz delivered a speech of political content, sharply criticising the existing social order in Russia (CDAVO g: 5-6).

The camp chorus performed revolutionary songs in front of the audience, passionate speeches against the Russian autocracy were delivered from the improvised rostrum, and besides, the speakers recited poems by Ivan Franko (“The Stonemasons” and “The Eternal Revolutionary”). In his final speech, I. Moroz called on the

campers to “take home everything they learned here and spread it everywhere”. On this day, everyone should “stand under the red flag together with his national one!”, all should be united by the two slogans “Long live the united workers!” and “Long live free Ukraine!” (CDAVO g: 7-17).

On the occasion of the holiday, the Jewish organisation addressed a greeting (sealed and signed by the board of the Jewish Social and Educational Circle). The mutual invitation to festivities and the cross-participation of representatives of both Ukrainian and Jewish organisations in the celebration of 1 May, testified to the existence of working and friendly relations between the two national communities, which managed to ensure sustainable development of cultural, national and social life in conditions of camp isolation.

It is obvious that celebration of 1 May became possible thanks to the permission and assistance of the camp commandant’s office, and the corresponding sanction of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. But while authorising this and other similar events in the Freistadt camp, official Vienna nurtured its own goals, which in fact continued and added to a separate vector of German foreign policy. The latter was to weaken the Russian Empire by supporting radical revolutionary parties, whose members crossed the front line in various ways to undermine the rear of the Russian army and revolutionise the subjects of the Russian tsar.

At the same time, the Austrian and German general staffs relied heavily on members of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Bolsheviks) – (RSDLP (b)), whose leader V. Ulyanov-Lenin and a group of like-minded people were transported in an extraterritorial carriage from Switzerland to Petrograd in early April 1917. The coup d’état he organised a few months later effectively destroyed old Russia and postponed for a short time the collapse and fall of imperial institutions in Austria-Hungary and Germany itself.

Jews who belonged to the RSDLP (b) also played a very active role in removing the Provisional Government from power and while being mobilised in the tsar’s army and taken prisoners, they managed (with the assistance of the Austrian and German authorities) to return home and join the struggle against the tsarism. The Ukrainians performed rather an ancillary function, although struggle of the national

“outskirts” against the Russian imperial centre was one of the important factors for the total collapse of Russia as well.

After the Bolsheviks’ coming to power, Austria-Hungary in fact gave up further revolutionising captured Ukrainians and Jews having no need to do it. However, one of its consequences was a significant “leftist shift” of the political views of some Ukrainians and Jews, pushing off their national feelings to the background. It should be mentioned that not all prisoners were ready for conscious perception of radical political and social slogans, and moreover, of the demagogic slogans of the Bolsheviks.

3. Conclusions

The process of revolutionising the captured Ukrainians was started by the ULU after the first successes of Ukrainian propaganda in the Freistadt camp and emergence of organised circles of conscious Ukrainians, ready to fight for the Ukrainian national idea in conditions of captivity. It should be noted that at this stage almost everyone of the undereducated mass of soldiers did not at all accept the idea of Ukraine’s independence, and in this situation the discussion of social oppression in Russia was more appealing for the campers. Under this condition, even the Black Hundreds’ appeals concerning loyalty to the Russian tsarist regime were rejected by the prisoners, who clearly understood the injustice of the social system in Russia.

The Ukrainisation of the camp’s inhabitants and their public awareness initiated complex processes of differentiation among the campers, as a result of which they might be divided into three numerically unequal groups; at the very beginning, just a few supported the Ukrainian national liberation slogans, the Black Hundred minority of prisoners (among them the ensigns were especially active) stood for “Faith, Tsar and Fatherland”, the third largest group of captives, having no their own worldview, initially followed the Black Hundreds and “Lesser Russians”.

The Black Hundreds made every effort to prevent or at least slow down the process of national and social awakening of the captured Ukrainians and Jews in Freistadt, using also the arrival of A. Romanova, the Sister of Mercy. The latter, using her status and commitments of Austrian authorities, deliberately provoked the na-

tionally engaged part of the prisoners with her deeply convinced “Russianness” (hardly wonder) and her full inability to understand social and national aspirations of Ukrainians and Jews. There is every reason to believe that the main tasks of her mission to the camp were propaganda and mobilisation aimed at the Black Hundreds and “Lesser Russians”, and provocation and dissociation concerning members of Ukrainian and Jewish camp organisations.

A. Romanova’s address to the prisoners using only *thou* testified to her superior, as well as contemptuous attitude to the organised community of prisoners and enables to conclude about her low level of intelligence and lack of upbringing. And it was unworthy of the Russian aristocrat to try to find out the political moods of the campers and the level of their loyalty to the Russian autocrat while carrying out a humanitarian action of visiting any of prisoner-of-war camps in Austria-Hungary. So, it is not surprising that some members of the camp community used rather radical and even insulting remarks about her. It is obvious that the captives should not have “moved on to personalities”, but the “sister” did everything she could to set a conscious part of the camp community against herself.

In the end, the most important point was that thanks to the principal position of the members of Ukrainian and Jewish organisations, which they consistently defended during the visit of the Russian Red Cross representative to the Freistadt camp, it became possible to unite the part of prisoners (both Jews and Ukrainians) having national and democratic worldview. At the same time, the articulation by A. Vaks and his associates of their critical attitude to the imperial regulations in Russia caused many of those campers (who were not members of Ukrainian and Jewish camp organisations) to think over the real situation of the oppressed by the Russian tsar.

The “inhospitable” reception of A. Romanova by the captured Jews in the camp vividly demonstrated a tendency to politisation of their views, and also caused positive changes in the Jewish-Ukrainian dialogue in Freistadt. It was very important that the leading members of the Jewish national organisation set an example of having no compromise with the Russian tsar, and that only political awareness of the peoples enslaved by the Russian Empire (including Jewish and Ukrainian) could shake the

foundations of Moscow despotism and put an end to centuries-old national oppression of “aliens”.

Further development of national and patriotic activities in the Freistadt camp led to gradual destruction of the Black Hundred ideology in the minds of prisoners, while the decline of “Lesser-Russianness” in the worldview of Ukrainians was going on. In 1916, the ideas of national liberation supported by the ULU and Ukrainian activists, were embracing more and more prisoners, so the scales in the confrontation between the Russian Black Hundred obscurantists and Ukrainians began to lean more obviously towards the latter.

Ukrainian and Jewish activists of the camp managed to develop national cultural and educational centres and involve the overwhelming majority of the campers into participation in them. Hidden opponents of the Ukrainian and Jewish national ideas no longer dared to oppose them openly, and the camp was more and more gaining its national content due to the activities of “Rozvaha” camp magazine, amateur theatre (Ukrainian and Jewish), educational courses and schools, national and public associations and other camp institutions. Thus, the competition of worldviews in Freistadt ended in favour of Ukrainians, after which the camp in Freistadt became one of the centres of Ukrainian life in Austria-Hungary, spreading its standards of civic activism (through workers’ teams leaving it for various Austrian regions) far beyond the camp.

Such a high level of self-organisation of captive Ukrainians and Jews caused the Austro-Hungarian authorities to intensify the process of revolutionising the camp, using somewhat unusual methods (as for captivity conditions). It concerned celebration of 1 May, when symbols of red colours and appropriate slogans were used, which was strictly prohibited to the subjects of the Austrian emperor during the war. However, all the conditions were created for the prisoners of war to celebrate this holiday, expecting that sooner or later they will return home and spread the patterns of social activities they have experienced.

However despite such “selfish” intentions of official Vienna, which hoped to radicalise public sentiments in Russia’s “outskirts” by revolutionising captive Ukrainians and Jews, the latter became enabled to learn at least the basic foundations

of political culture and gain some social experience. When they returned home, the former prisoners took an active part in the social and political life of Ukraine, though the vast majority of Ukrainians realised themselves in national parties, while the Jews – in all-Russian ones, which spread their activities to Ukrainian lands.

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wpłynęło/received 29.04.2022; poprawiono/revised 22.05.2022

Recenzje książek
Book reviews

Zamiast recenzji

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Igor Okuniew: *Geografia polityczna*. Kraków 2021: Polskie Towarzystwo Geopolityczne; 446 pp. Tłumaczenie: Adam Kochanecki.

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Wpłynęło/received 21.04.2022; poprawiono/revised 28.04.2022



ISSN 2084-1558